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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The recent rise in nonprime mortgage foreclosures has opened a new and costly 
chapter in many of the nation’s most distressed urban neighborhoods. Particularly 
problematic is the fact that today’s foreclosures impose significant costs not only on 
borrowers and lenders, but also on municipal governments, neighboring homeowners 
and others with a financial interest in nearby properties. While there is an extensive 
literature on the impact that delinquency, default, and foreclosure have on lenders, 
borrowers, and other entities that are direct parties to the mortgage transaction in 
question, the costs that these mortgage failures impose on municipalities and other third 
parties are far less well understood. This is due to two factors. First, municipal and other 
third party costs are difficult to identify, and therefore often go undetected. Second, 
even where identified, the activities that generate costs often blend in with other 
governmental functions, or are otherwise difficult to quantify, reinforcing the tendency 
for them to remain invisible. 
 
This study attempts to fill that void. Using the City of Chicago as a case in point, this 
study presents a conceptual framework that makes explicit the various costs of 
foreclosure, especially as they relate to local governments and courts. By carefully 
reviewing the foreclosure process as it plays out in Chicago, the paper isolates 26 
separate costs incurred for the provision of ‘foreclosure related services.’ These costs 
reflect actions undertaken by 15 separate governmental units that are part of the overall 
municipal infrastructure underlying the foreclosure process. While in some cases these 
municipal activities are limited to simple and relatively inexpensive ministerial duties of 
agencies like the Recorder of Deeds, in more complex foreclosure scenarios these 
municipal costs can reach tens of thousands of dollars. In extreme cases, the 
concentrated foreclosures can put downward pressure on area property values and 
indirectly rob area homeowners of hundreds of thousands of dollars of home equity. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
 
Foreclosures, especially in the nonprime mortgage market, have been on the rise for 
over a decade. While mortgages of all types may end up in foreclosure, the rate of 
serious delinquencies and foreclosures for nonprime loans can easily be ten times 
higher than the rate for prime loans due to a number of factors, most obviously the 
generally lower credit quality of the borrowers. Moreover, the focus on credit impaired 
and higher risk borrowers leads to a natural tendency for nonprime foreclosures to 
cluster in lower-income and largely minority distressed urban areas. 
 
This tendency for nonprime foreclosures to cluster generates significant negative 
spillover effects. Since many foreclosed properties become vacant and abandoned, 
they act as magnets for crime, violence, and other social ills. The foreclosure situation 
facing property owners on a single block in the Auburn/Gresham neighborhood of 
Chicago is illustrative. Over the past decade, the block’s 37 properties experienced 14 
separate foreclosures, with several homes going through the foreclosure process 
multiple times. Accounting for both the foreclosure costs paid for by City and County 
agencies, and the impact of foreclosures on area property values, a foreclosure on this 
block could impose direct costs on local government agencies totaling more than 
$34,000 and indirect effects on nearby property owners (in the form of reduced property 
values and home equity) of as much as an additional $220,000. 
 
Foreclosure related costs of this magnitude raise a number of policy concerns. At the 
core of these concerns are questions about how best to reduce the financial burden 
foreclosures impose on neighbors and municipalities, and how best to pay for the 
unavoidable costs that do arise. The fact that municipalities and residents living near the 
foreclosed property currently bear a significant portion of foreclosure related costs is 
certainly an unintended consequence of efforts to attract mortgage capital to previously 
underserved inner-city areas. The result, however, is that local taxpayers and area 
residents are forced to shoulder burdens that are rightfully the responsibility of 
borrowers, mortgage lenders and others that are direct parties to the mortgage 
transaction. The failure of borrowers and lenders to pay the full social costs of nonprime 
lending also leads to perverse market effects, as less than scrupulous lending 
organizations overextend credit to highly foreclosure prone borrowers.  
 
The extension of mortgage lending to higher risk borrowers has benefited millions. At 
the same time, risk-based pricing only efficiently allocates mortgage credit if all the 
expected risks and costs are reflected in the pricing of the deal. In the many instances 
in today’s market where nonprime loans are likely to lead to concentrated foreclosures 
that produce significant negative external effects, this is simply not the case. Absent 
greater efforts to identify those costs that properly should be paid by some combination 
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of the borrower, originator, noteholder, and/or other parties to the transaction, 
competitive pressures favor a race to the bottom as some lenders lower their standards 
to extend their reach into ever more risky and vulnerable urban neighborhoods. In such 
a race, market share flows to entities willing to under price their product at origination 
only to later leave behind a host of costs that are ultimately paid by municipalities, 
neighboring homeowners and businesses, and other mortgage entities invested in the 
neighborhoods where these loans go bad.  
  
To address the rising costs of foreclosures, municipalities, along with their industry and 
non-profit partners have much work to do. First and foremost, it is imperative that 
municipalities join with responsible mortgage industry and community leaders to reduce 
the incidence of poorly underwritten and/or fraudulent loans made in distressed 
neighborhoods. Beyond these efforts lie a number of workable and effective solutions 
through which industry, government, and non-profit organizations can reduce the 
damage foreclosures cause in vulnerable urban neighborhoods. The following three 
areas summarize the most promising strategies.  
 
Reform Key Elements of the Foreclosure Process 
The current level of public awareness and concern about concentrated foreclosures 
provides an excellent opportunity to reassess state and local laws governing the 
foreclosure process, some of which increase the costs that foreclosures impose on 
others while providing little or no compensating benefit to borrowers or lenders. Here 
the case of so-called ‘walkaways,’ in which both borrower and lender abandon their 
interest in the property, is illustrative. Procedures designed to speed the transfer of 
potential walkways to the City’s land bank or to a designated non-profit before squatters 
and illicit activities arrive on the scene would substantially reduce the total social cost of 
foreclosures. Other solutions could involve better coordination of the activities of the 
various municipal agencies involved in the foreclosure process, including better 
coordination with the loan servicer and the note holder to minimize the overall extent 
and costs of foreclosures.  
 
Support Collaborative Foreclosure Avoidance Efforts 
Innovative programs now in operation demonstrate that it is possible for government, 
industry, and non-profits to address the challenges posed by the growth in nonprime 
foreclosures, and in doing so devise solutions that are not available to any of the parties 
individually. For example, working in partnership with Neighborhood Housing Services 
of Chicago and a group of responsible nonprime lenders, the City of Chicago is helping 
distressed borrowers gain access to legitimate and effective credit counseling services 
and other foreclosure avoidance information through its 311 non-emergency call system.  
 
 
   
                   - - 3 - - 
The 311 operators directly link callers to the Credit Counseling Resource Center (CCRC) 
a national counseling network created to “help distressed borrowers restore financial 
balance to their lives.”  
 
To help build public trust in the 311 approach, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley led a 
highly visible campaign to introduce the system and encourage distressed borrowers to 
seek help before it becomes too late. Callers have the opportunity to receive counseling 
from the Credit Counseling Resource Center (CCRC), a national alliance of HUD 
Certified Housing Counseling agencies operated by the Homeownership Preservation 
Foundation, and then be put in contact with the loan servicer to explore a potential 
workout or be referred to other available local resources or assistance if appropriate. 
The goal is to help distressed borrowers find the best way to address a temporary 
financial crisis, to mitigate the downside effects of a permanent income reduction, or to 
devise strategies to better manage their credit and/or to avoid foreclosure. Half of the 
credit counseling is paid for by lenders that have signed on to the program, while the 
City picks up the tab for the customers of others that have not joined the effort.  
 
Encourage all Industry Participants to Pay Their Fair Share of Foreclosure 
Related Costs 
Although well targeted municipal expenditures for foreclosure avoidance efforts can 
reap tremendous rewards in terms of avoided costs, it is also important that parties to 
the mortgage transaction pay their share of the cost generated by the foreclosures that 
do occur. To accomplish this, municipalities should carefully review the costs of 
providing foreclosure related services, move to increase the cost effectiveness of the 
delivery of these services, and, as appropriate, recover all or some of these costs 
through higher user fees. In addition, municipalities should work with industry leaders to 
ensure that by better coordination of the foreclosure process, municipalities are able to 
recover a fair share of the municipal costs from the proceeds of foreclosure sales. 
 
While in theory correctly pricing municipal services will promote efficient resource 
allocation, in some cases the cost of collection is prohibitively high. One way to help 
municipalities address the rising costs linked to nonprime foreclosures would be to 
require nonprime lenders to pay a reasonable fee - tied to the likelihood that the 
mortgage will fail - into a central remediation fund when they originate a mortgage. 
Alternatively money could be collected on a voluntary basis, with the proceeds targeted 
to promote foreclosure avoidance activities. Of course municipalities will inevitably bear 
some of the costs of foreclosure and therefore must be prepared to deploy their own 
resources to support foreclosure avoidance strategies that help families in distress, limit 
damage to surrounding stakeholders, and reduce their own overall exposure to future 
foreclosure related expenditures. 
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REPORT METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE  
 
This report is based on a detailed examination of relevant sections of City of Chicago 
and Cook County budgets for 2003 and 2004, as well a series of interviews with key 
informants in various departments in Chicago. Interviews were conducted primarily in 
person and in some cases by phone between August and November of 2004. 
Throughout the report, interviewees are identified by Department only, rather than by 
name, in keeping with our agreements prior to those interviews. For the most part, 
interviewees hold positions of significant responsibility in Chicago’s governance 
structure, such as Deputy Director or Assistant Commissioner. 
 
The research is funded by the Homeownership Preservation Foundation, a charitable 
organization established in 2004. The report serves as a companion effort to the Home 
Ownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI), a collaborative effort between the mortgage 
industry, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, and the City of Chicago to 
improve foreclosure avoidance efforts and reduce the impact of mortgage foreclosures 
on Chicago’s lower-income neighborhoods. 
 
The structure of the report is as follows: Section 1 presents a detailed typology of 
foreclosure costs that are borne by individuals and entities that are not direct parties to 
the loan transaction. Section 2 then documents in some detail the foreclosure process 
as experienced in the City of Chicago and other cities. Next, Section 3 uses Chicago 
budget and other information to estimate costs of providing 26 distinct foreclosure-
related services provided by 15 separate agencies. These individual cost estimates are 
then combined in a series of scenarios designed to estimate the direct municipal costs 
associated with simple foreclosure cases in which the home is quickly vacated and 
resold, to those in which the property lingers vacant for years, motivating significant 
municipal expenditures. These include costs associated with court procedures, record 
keeping, demolition of abandoned buildings, and efforts by the Departments of Building, 
Police, Fire and other municipal agencies to address the adverse neighborhood 
consequences of a prolonged foreclosure process. The final section of the report places 
the report’s findings in the context of broader nonprime mortgage market trends and 
related public policy discussions. 
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SECTION 1: A SIMPLE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SOCIAL 
COST OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES 
 
This section presents a simple conceptual framework for thinking about the social costs 
of foreclosure. It includes costs incurred by borrowers, mortgage lenders and other 
parties to the mortgage transaction, as well as others living and/or having business 
interests located near the foreclosed property. The framework not only makes explicit 
social costs of foreclosure that are typically ignored, it serves to situate costs incurred 
by municipalities and courts within this larger framework. The remainder of this section 
enumerates the cost categories for each entity in additional detail. 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
As illustrated in Figure A, four distinct groups – borrowers, lenders, neighbors, and 
municipalities - are affected by foreclosures. As noted, the impact extends well beyond 
the individual borrower and lender or other mortgage industry parties with a direct 
financial interest in a particular loan in default (hereafter simply referred to as the 
mortgage lender or lender).1 Additional costs are incurred by ‘neighbors,’ including the 
owners of homes and commercial establishments, and others with a financial interest in 
properties located near to the foreclosure site. Note that this last group also includes 
other mortgage lenders with outstanding loans on properties in the neighborhood. Local 
municipalities and court systems also incur costs linked to providing services as part of 
the foreclosure process. To the extent that foreclosures reduce the value of homes and 
businesses – a particular concern when foreclosures are concentrated – local 
governments will suffer a loss in property tax revenue as well.   
 
Potentially, entities falling into each of the four groups are subject to both direct and 
indirect impacts from mortgage foreclosures. Direct impacts can be either monetary, 
non-monetary, or both. In Figure A, solid lines depict costs that are incurred by the 
borrower and the lender and are clearly reflected in the pricing of mortgage loans. 
Dotted lines are used to indicate costs that mortgage foreclosures impose on society 
but are not reflected in the price of credit in the mortgage contract. Further discussion of 
these various costs follows. 
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1  Depending on the details of the transaction, these parties may include the lender, the servicer, the mortgage insurer, the 
securities issuer, the investor, and various other participants in the primary and secondary mortgage markets. 
Borrowers 
Mortgage borrowers experience many obvious direct, monetary costs in the foreclosure 
process. As shown at the left of Figure A, these include: net loss on downpayment and 
principal paid; penalties and fees charged by servicers during the period of delinquency 
and default; and legal fees associated with the foreclosure process. Borrowers’ indirect 
costs result mainly from increased future borrowing costs as a result of diminished 
credit quality and from the expenses associated with moving to a new unit. Non-
pecuniary costs include but are not limited to: the emotional and physical stress of 
managing the foreclosure process; and the psychological effects of a dramatic and 
public ‘failure’ at one of life’s key milestones and simultaneous reduction in 
socioeconomic status; and negative effects on children in households forced to move as 
a result of foreclosure.2 
 
 
Figure A: The Social Cost of Foreclosure 
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2  For summary of the negative impact of unexpected relocation on the educational achievement of children see Eric A. 
Hanushek, John F. Kain, and Steven G. Rivkin, (2004). Disruption versus Tiebout Improvement: The Costs and Benefits of 
Switching Schools. Journal of Public Economics, 88(9): 1721-1746. 
Mortgage Lenders 
For mortgage lenders and other industry parties to the mortgage transaction, direct 
costs of mortgage failures are legion. They include: reduction in the value of assets held 
by mortgage investors, increased servicing expenses, and the opportunity cost of funds 
tied up in the foreclosure process. Similarly, there are many indirect costs, including 
weaker pricing on subsequent bond issues and increased monitoring costs in 
originations. Further, to the extent that one foreclosure makes subsequent foreclosures 
on nearby loans more likely (‘foreclosure contagion’), the indirect impacts of foreclosure 
cycle back to produce additional indirect effects on the lender or the investor in the 
foreclosed property, as contagion may weaken the performance of other loans in their 
portfolio. Finally non-pecuniary costs include exposure to ‘headline’ or reputational risk 
associated with being publicly perceived as responsible for removing families from their 
homes. 
 
Neighbors 
Neighbors (including nearby property owners, businesses, and others with financial 
interests in the area) also suffer from foreclosures and the vacancies they generate. 
Given that foreclosures tend to concentrate in low-income and/or minority 
neighborhoods, many of these ‘external’ costs are incurred by some of the nation’s most 
vulnerable households.3 Direct monetary costs for neighbors include but are not limited 
to loss of rent collected by neighborhood landlords and reduced sales by local 
businesses. Non-pecuniary costs are often linked to quality-of-life issues of great 
concern to most families, such as crime. Police officials interviewed for this report noted 
a range of social ills occurring in vacant properties, including gang activity, drug dealing, 
prostitution, arson, rape, and even murder. The presence of vacant homes and those in 
foreclosure also has an indirect effect that operates through their negative impact on 
local property values and price trends. As a result, these indirect effects are a major 
concern for existing homeowners and prospective buyers in the area, as well as other 
mortgage lenders and servicers operating in the area. Indeed, because the cost of 
mortgage capital at some level reflects the likelihood and severity of default, 
foreclosures indirectly raise mortgage interest rates for all new borrowers, and reduce 
the market value of all existing loans. 
 
Municipalities 
Though there is some variation from one city to the next due to local ordinances and 
state-level legislation governing the foreclosure process, direct costs to municipalities 
and local courts typically include some or all of the following: increased policing; 
increased burden on fire departments (due to vandalism and/or arson); demolition costs; 
building inspections; legal expenses; costs associated with managing the foreclosure 
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3  See Duda, M. and W. Apgar. 2004. Mortgage Foreclosure Trends in Los Angeles: Patterns and Policy Issues. Report 
prepared for Los Angeles Neighborhood Housing Services. July. 
process or resulting from it (e.g., record keeping/updating); and increased demand for 
city social service programs. In the case of completed foreclosures, costs are also 
incurred for human services programs aimed at reducing the negative effects of 
foreclosure on families, such as homelessness prevention activities. These costs accrue 
during the foreclosure process and in some cases afterwards as well. Especially in 
cases where the property has little no economic value, the city inherits the responsibility 
for securing and/or demolishing the unit, removing trash from the lot, mowing the lawn, 
and a range of other activities intended to keep the unit from becoming a dangerous 
eyesore.  
 
Foreclosure also leads to a direct loss of tax revenues. A borrower in financial distress 
often simply stops paying their property tax. Though the municipality can issue a lien 
against the property, this process can take months or years to complete and even then 
the municipality may have to settle for less than full repayment. Equally costly can be 
situations when the foreclosure leads to the demolition of the structure judged to be 
unsecured and a public nuisance. In such instances the tax base is diminished by the 
assessed value of the structure demolished.4  
 
Indirect costs to municipalities occur mostly through the impact that foreclosures, 
especially concentrated foreclosures, can have on house price appreciation.5 Because 
homes often deteriorate and/or become vacant during the foreclosure process, they 
often become associated with crime and general unsightliness, and act as a deterrent 
for prospective homebuyers. In addition, the presence of foreclosed properties may 
encourage existing stable owners to leave the area. Reduced attractiveness of the 
neighborhood and its associated reduction in the rate of increase of home values 
translates into slower growth (or potentially a decline) in the municipal property tax base. 
This same phenomenon may also adversely impact business location decisions as well 
as reduce the profitability of existing business in the city. This in turn can impact sales 
and income tax receipts in municipalities where they exist.  
 
Of course, high foreclosure areas are also subject to speculation by investors seeking to 
either convert the building to rental uses, and or to flip an often deteriorated property to 
unsuspecting first time buyers. Both outcomes can give the appearance of increasing 
the values of homes in otherwise distressed areas. Yet even to the extent that short 
term sales prices appear to be on the rise, their positive impact on longer term property 
values is short lived as the appraisal fraud and other related activities underlying these 
schemes are ultimately revealed. By this time, the perpetrators of these schemes are 
long gone, while the lender and/or the city are left to work through a messy new 
foreclosure. Alternatively the flipper can sell the home at an inflated price to 
                                                 
4  These two direct tax effects are explained more fully in Appendix A. 
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5  Further discussion of the indirect impact of foreclosures on property values and tax revenues is presented in Appendix B. 
unsuspecting buyer. The new buyer must pay higher mortgage and property taxes - 
costs that they often cannot afford on a home that may be worth less than the amount 
owed on the mortgage. This again can trigger another round of foreclosure and loss. 
 
Finally, in addition to having direct and indirect impact on municipal expenditures and 
receipts, foreclosures also have a non-pecuniary cost component as well. Just like 
companies and individuals, municipalities care about their reputation. To the extent that 
the growth of foreclosures and resulting vacancies undermine the attractiveness of 
particular neighborhoods, the municipality may gain a reputation as not being a good 
place to live and work – a negative image that may extend well into the future.  
 
In general, this section has illustrated the fact that the damage caused by increased 
rates of mortgage foreclosure is substantial and wide-ranging. In contrast to general 
perceptions about the mortgage market which suggest that the cost of mortgage failures 
are shared by borrowers and industry participants, the conceptual scheme here argues 
that mortgage failures impose substantial third party costs. The remainder of the report 
focuses on the direct municipal component of these costs, bringing to light and detailing 
these formerly hidden costs of mortgage foreclosure. 
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SECTION 2: MORTGAGE FAILURES AND THE FORECLOSURE  
PROCESS IN CHICAGO 
 
Following a brief discussion of the extent of foreclosure activity in the City of Chicago, 
this section describes the complex foreclosure process as it plays out in Chicago in 
order to illustrate the numerous mechanisms through which mortgage failures impose 
costs on municipal governments. Since loans that are simply delinquent or in default 
may generate municipal costs even if foreclosure is never fully consummated, the 
section describes the many ways that Cook County and the City of Chicago incur direct 
and indirect costs as a result of what are here referred to as ‘mortgage failures,’ a term 
that includes delinquent mortgages that may cure before the foreclosure process in 
complete, as well as situations where delinquent mortgages do not end in a foreclosure 
sale because the potential foreclosing agent is financially better off walking away from 
his or her interest than taking possession of the property. This latter situation is 
responsible for some of the most costly ‘mortgage failures’ that Chicago and other cities 
experience.  
 
Because the subset of units that become vacant and are unsecured during the 
foreclosure process pose the most pressing public safety issues and command the 
majority of effort and resources, the discussion is dominated by procedures and 
expenditures related to vacancy and rectifying code violations.6 Although some cost 
information is presented here in order to flesh out the descriptions, information on 
specific municipal costs is largely reserved for Section 3 and the methodological 
appendix in which the focus is on estimating these costs, rather than understanding the 
foreclosure process. 
 
 
THE GROWTH OF FORECLOSURES IN CHICAGO 
 
Foreclosures, particularly nonprime foreclosures, have been on the rise in Chicago and 
other major metropolitan areas for over a decade. Compared with prime loans, one 
recent study found that nonprime loans have serious delinquency rates and foreclosure 
rates that can be as much as 10 times higher than the rate for prime loans.7 Moreover 
and as noted above, there is growing evidence that nonprime foreclosures tend to 
cluster in lower-income and largely minority distressed urban areas. 
                                                 
6  Although foreclosures are not the only source of vacancies (others include owners dying without heirs, fires, and landlords 
being unable to attract tenants to marginal properties), they are the largest. Consensus among our interviewees put the share 
of foreclosure-generated vacancies at 60 percent of the total.  
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7  See Amy Crews Cutts and Robert Van Order. 2003. On the Economics of Subprime Lending. Freddie Mac working paper. 
March.  
Best available estimates suggest that the foreclosure and serious delinquency rate in 
Chicago stood at 4.7 percent in 2001 – over ten times the national average for prime 
conventional loans.8  In the nine low-income neighborhoods served by Neighborhood 
Housing Services of Chicago (NHSC), the foreclosure rate reached 7.7 percent in 2001. 
Overall, some 40 percent of all completed foreclosures in Chicago were in these nine 
targeted neighborhoods. Yet, these communities represented only 5 percent of all 
mortgage originations in 2001 and account for just 18 percent of the city’s population.  
 
The foreclosure situation in the 8300 Block of South Morgan Street in the 
Auburn/Gresham neighborhood provides a clear example of foreclosure concentration. 
As shown in Figure B, since 1990 the 37 homes on this block have experienced 14 
foreclosures, affecting 9 separate properties. NHSC Executive Director Bruce Gottschall 
argues that the phenomenon of foreclosure contagion is very real in these 
neighborhoods. He describes the dynamic as one in which “one foreclosure often 
prompts another and another and in no time a decade of neighborhood revitalization 
work can be undone.”  
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8  Michael Collins (2003). Chicago’s Homeownership Preservation Challenge: Foreclosures. Presentation to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago. February. 
Figure B: Case Study of Foreclosure Impact: Auburn/Gresham 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the explosion of nonprime lending and the resulting rapid rise in foreclosures 
in selected neighborhoods has forced city and county agencies to ramp up activities of 
those agencies involved in serious delinquency and foreclosure related activities and 
vacancies.  
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DIRECT EFFECTS OF VACANT AND OPEN UNITS ON CITY SERVICE 
CONSUMPTION  
 
Foreclosures and vacancies consume so many resources in part because they involve 
so many different agencies. As discussed here and described more fully in Appendix A, 
no fewer than 15 City and County departments play a role in conducting and 
documenting the process and rectifying its material effects on communities. Collectively, 
the activities of these departments constitute the complex infrastructure of mortgage 
foreclosures and vacancy remediation. To illustrate how this infrastructure functions, 
this section presents a number of representative foreclosure pathways. It is useful to 
bear in mind, however, these pathways inevitably obscure much of the complexity 
involved in coordinating activities across various agencies and the timing of the multiple 
layers of service provision. 
 
Beginning at the point when default becomes sufficiently serious that the servicer 
initiates foreclosure proceedings (i.e., files the lis pendens), Figure C highlights the key 
junctures in the foreclosure/vacancy process from a municipal cost perspective. These 
are: whether or not a unit becomes vacant, whether a vacant unit is secured or 
unsecured, whether the case enters the court system or not, and whether an unsecured 
unit is demolished or conserved. As indicated by the box at the right and dotted arrows, 
the foreclosure process can end abruptly at any point if the borrower sells the home and 
pays off the loan or manages to cure the delinquency. Barring these solutions, three 
outcomes are possible as shown at the bottom of Figure C: the home is sold at a 
foreclosure sale, the property is abandoned by both borrower and noteholder (with or 
without the structure being torn down), or the unit is razed and the lot sold at foreclosure 
sale. The rest of this subsection fleshes out the flow chart in Figure C, providing 
additional detail and linking municipal agencies to the performance of various roles in 
the process. 
  
Simple Foreclosure 
When the servicer files a lis pendens and the loan does not cure, the foreclosure 
process is at its most straightforward (and least costly) in cases where the unit never 
becomes vacant. In such cases involvement by the County occurs in its role as a 
provider of foreclosure reporting and record keeping, and as operator of Chancery Court, 
through which all foreclosures must pass owing to Illinois’s status as a judicial 
foreclosure state. In Figure C, this situation is represented by the path: Never Vacant Æ 
Unit Conserved Æ Home Sold at Foreclosure Sale. As many as six separate Cook 
County departments are involved and additional complications sometimes ensue when 
the County Sheriff’s Department is required to evict a failed borrower.9  
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9  These six are the Recorder of Deeds, Office of the Chief Judge, the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Office of the Judiciary, Court 
Services, and the Sheriff’s Office. 
Figure C: The Foreclosure and Vacancy Process in Chicago 
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oreclosures become rapidly more complex and costly for municipalities in situations in 
hich the unit becomes vacant. This sequence begins when vacancies are reported to 
he Department of Buildings (DOB) either directly or via Aldermen, the Mayor’s office, 
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the 311 Information System (the City’s non-emergency call system), concerned 
neighbors, community groups, Police and Fire officials, or Building Inspectors in the field 
doing other jobs. Following receipt of a complaint, DOB sends Inspectors to the unit to 
confirm its vacant status, and to log and document code violations for which the City 
issues fines. At this point DOB places the unit on either a demolition or conservation 
track, depending on structural characteristics and the likelihood that it can be 
successfully reintegrated into the City’s housing stock. Municipal procedures and costs 
differ for each track. 
 
Demolition Track 
The preferred method for dealing with properties that are “vacant, open, and constitute 
a hazard to the community” is the City’s Fast Track Demolition (FTD) process.10 Fast 
Track avoids the more lengthy court procedures through which the City can obtain the 
right to demolish structures that constitute a threat to public safety. Under Fast Track, 
the City serves notice to parties with a legal interest in the building alerting them that 
they must secure, repair, or demolish the structure.11 If after thirty days the property 
remains vacant and open, the parties are formally notified of the City’s intention to 
wreck the structure. Following a ten day waiting period in which the City solicits bids 
from demolition contractors, the structure is torn down at City expense and a lien 
(superseding all others except tax liens) is issued against the property to cover the 
demolition cost. In the flow chart, this series of events is captured by the path:  
Vacant Æ Unsecured Æ Fast Track Demolition Æ Unit Demolished (at which point the 
lot can either be sold at foreclosure sale or abandoned). Abandoned lots can 
subsequently be acquired by the City if it chooses to foreclose on the demolition lien or 
other outstanding municipal liens, a process that takes over a year in the quickest cases 
and many years in slower ones. 
 
If the owner objects to FTD or the public safety threat posed by the vacant structure is 
less imminent, the case is tried in what is widely known as ‘Demo Court,’ in reality part 
of the Housing Court section of the Circuit Court of Cook County’s First Municipal 
Bureau.12 The process begins when the Building Inspector’s report is sent to the 
Department of Law (DOL), which drafts and files a formal complaint, and issues 
summons to all legally interested parties.13 The first court date is typically two to three 
months after the initial inspection. As the process unfolds the City has the legal right to 
compel the owner to secure the property, clean it up, and remove dangerous porches. If 
                                                 
10 A more detailed version of the fast track process is available by going to http://egov.cityofchicago.org/city/webportal/home.do 
and searching for ‘Fast Track Demolition.’ 
11 Notification occurs by four methods: posting at the site; certified mail; recording a ‘Notice of Violation’ with the Cook County 
Recorder of Deeds; and publication in the classified section of the newspaper. 
12 Much of the information on Demo Court is drawn from a manuscript entitled Introduction to Demolition Court by David Smith, a 
Senior Counsel at the City’s Department of Law. 
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13 If the defendant(s) cannot be located, the intent to demolish is published in the classified section of the newspaper. 
the owner refuses, the City can also perform these activities itself and issue liens to 
cover their cost. 
 
In order for the court to order a building demolished, the City must prove that the 
structure is a threat to public safety and beyond reasonable repair. If the case is 
unopposed, the Court usually orders demolition. These demolitions are done by 
contractor at City expense, again with the City issuing liens to cover the cost. The City 
then has the option of foreclosing on this lien and eventually selling the property to 
cover its costs (done for 200-300 loans annually), a process typically requiring several 
years. In most cases these liens are not actively pursued, though some in the ‘passive 
pool’ (roughly 5,000 loans at any one time) eventually repay. If the owner contests 
demolition, the court will order the defendant to bring the building up to code by a 
certain date. The City can either agree with the defendant’s plan (‘consent decree’) or 
object to it (where objecting indicates a belief that the defendant will not actually bring 
the building up to code). In the latter case the City sets a legally binding time table for 
finishing the repairs called a ‘mandatory order of full compliance’ which, if not met, can 
result in substantial fines. In such cases the Court may then allow the City to pursue its 
demolition of the building.  
 
In Figure C above, a case in Demolition Court can be represented by a number of paths, 
because there are a number of possible in-flow channels and outcomes. All begin with 
Vacant Æ Unsecured and reach Demolition Court either directly or after beginning in the 
Fast Track process. As an outcome of the Court proceedings the unit can either be 
Conserved or Demolished, with the former outcome being slightly more common. 
 
Conservation Track 
The alternative to demolition is conservation. If the Building Inspector’s report suggests 
that the structure is sound and worthy of maintaining as a component of the housing 
stock, effort is made to contact the owner and ensure compliance with regulations 
regarding vacant and open buildings. The City also issues fines for the code violations, 
which encourage compliance by the owner. If the owner responds to the City’s initial 
contact by properly securing the unit, registering it as vacant, and posting a required 
notice to this effect, the property can remain in this state until sold, or until further 
deterioration or other changes renders it a threat to public safety.14 
If the owner fails to comply, the City has two options, the Department of Administrative 
Hearings (DOAH) or Housing Court. Begun in 1997, DOAH is “the first unified municipal 
administrative adjudicatory system in the nation,” a City agency designed “for the 
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14 To register a vacant building, the City requires the owner of record to register it with the Department of Buildings within 30 
days of becoming vacant and pay $100 registration fee. The owner must also carry $300,000 of liability insurance on the 
property.  
expedient, independent and impartial adjudication of municipal ordinance violations.”15 
The 400,000 cases brought to DOAH annually involve nuisance issues affecting public 
health, safety, welfare and quality-of-life. Among other things, the City uses 
Administrative Hearings to collect fines for code violations and compel owners to secure 
vacant structures and rectify related problems in cases where the total amount owed is 
less than $50,000. For a conservation case in DOAH, the path in Figure C is: Vacant Æ 
Unsecured Æ Administrative Hearing Æ Unit Conserved, at which point the unit can be 
sold or ultimately abandoned. 
If fines exceed $50,000 or in cases where the issues involved are more complex, the 
City’s Department of Law (DOL) brings suit in the Housing Court branch of Cook County 
Superior Court. Because the legal process is slower and more complex, these cases 
result in some of the longest unsecured or marginally secured vacancy periods. For as 
long as the unit is vacant it is often accessible to vandals, squatters, and criminals, 
despite efforts to board and otherwise secure it. (In Chicago boarding is notoriously 
ineffective.) Defendants in Housing Court cases must obey the Court’s ruling or risk 
further sanction. The path and potential outcomes for the property are the same as for 
the previous example, except that Administrative Hearing is replaced by Housing Court 
at the legal channel juncture of the figure. 
 
Crime, Fires, and Trash  
Given the fact that in Illinois the foreclosure process typically lasts 13 months, a building 
may remain vacant and/or unsecured for months. Local governments may be forced to 
spend resources in several different ways. Of these, fighting crime is probably the 
greatest area of concern. One respondent from the police force characterized vacant 
properties as “a haven for bad people doing bad things.” This perspective was echoed 
by an Alderman who spoke of the extreme level of concern that vacant buildings cause 
among neighbors, community advocates, and police. 
 
Police involvement is often triggered by calls from neighbors who observe activity in and 
around abandoned buildings. In response, officers come to check the property and may 
follow this up with regular drive-by checks. Only if they determine that there is sufficient 
evidence to suspect criminal activity, however, can officers legally enter the property. In 
some cases this involves evicting squatters or chasing vandals. In others it can mean 
the more dangerous proposition of arresting drug dealers. In fact, drug dealing is 
perhaps the most problematic as well as the most common of the more serious crimes 
taking place in vacant buildings (though our respondents from the Police Department 
also mentioned prostitution, rape, and murder). Regardless of the magnitude of the 
crime they are investigating, the officers’ safety is always an issue because vacant 
buildings are often structurally compromised.  
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15 Quotes from DOAH website. http://www.ci.chi.il.us/AdminHearings/Information.html. 
A related concern is arson and other fire activity. Some vacant building fires are the 
result of arson by owners seeking to make insurance claims and others are set by 
vandals. According to the arson detective interviewed for this study, many fires are also 
started by squatters for cooking or keeping warm in buildings without utilities. Although 
intended as small campfires, these can and often do spread to the structure itself. Such 
blazes are often serious because no one calls the fire department when the fire is still 
small enough to be suppressed and, by the time the fire is visible to neighbors, it is 
often too late to do more than prevent it from spreading to neighboring homes. Fires in 
vacant units increase the overall municipal service consumption and detract from the 
Department’s ability to fight other fires. Our interviewee also noted that squatters who 
start accidental fires often simply move on to the closest vacant unit, at which point the 
process often repeats itself at the new location. 
 
Finally, whether the structure has been demolished or not, abandoned properties must 
have some degree of supervision and maintenance to prevent from becoming blighted 
eyesores or trash strewn lots. To prevent these potential negative outcomes, the City 
must periodically mow overgrown lawns and lots, and remove trash. The cost of doing 
so is significant, as evidenced a study in Buffalo putting the municipal cost of trash 
removal alone at $5,000.16 
 
Direct Loss of Property Tax Receipts 
Broadly speaking, municipalities suffer direct loss of property tax receipts in two ways. 
First, taxes owed by the property owner sometimes go unpaid due to foreclosure. 
Though much of the unpaid taxes are eventually recouped, in some cases the County 
fails to collect all taxes owed. Second, in cases where a housing unit is demolished 
because the home is judged to be unsafe and/or otherwise a public nuisance, the loss 
of revenue comes through the removal of the value of the ‘improvement’ to the raw land 
from the tax roles  
 
The most obvious loss of tax revenue occurs when property taxes are simply not paid. 
Like many municipalities, Chicago has a law mandating that delinquent property tax 
claims are sold in a timely manner in order to take advantage of the private sector’s 
willingness to return these units and parcels to the housing stock and, hence, to the 
active property tax paying roles. To implement this mandate, the periodic tax auctions 
are held, the goal of which is to transfer the claim on delinquent taxes to private 
investors at a discount to the actual amount owed in return for earlier collection on the 
debt. Claims purchased at the tax sale supersede any other liens or claims on the 
property and allow the tax investor to eventually take possession of the unit following a 
series of legal hurdles designed to ensure that the delinquent owner has been given 
opportunity to repay. Taxes are usually fully recouped at the ‘one year sale.’ 
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16 See Bendix Anderson. 2004. New Jersey Fights Blight. Affordable Housing Finance. June: 78-79. 
Occasionally properties not sold at the one year sale are bought at the County Clerk’s 
Office but this is rare. Most wind up in ‘scavenger sale’ and generate less than the full 
amount owed with variation accounted for by factors such as the quality of the structure, 
its investment potential, and the apparent likelihood that the property’s owner will 
eventually pay. In some cases tax bills cannot be sold at auction because there is 
simply no interested buyer.  
 
Utilities 
Since the City collects tax revenue on electric and gas bills, and is the water and sewer 
service provider, when these bills are unpaid City revenues are reduced 
commensurately. Unpaid water bills often run into the thousands of dollars. While the 
city has a process for attaching water liens to properties, the process is distinct from the 
activities of DOL and conducted by legal staff at the Water Department. As with Taxes, 
the City has the option of selling lien for collection by a third party, but this assumes that 
a willing third party exists. Moreover, the City could foreclose on the property, but that 
itself is a costly process, and often the city may be reluctant to take control of a property 
with little or no economic value.  
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SECTION 3: THE COST OF FORECLOSURE IN CHICAGO:   
SEVEN REPRESENTATIVE SCENARIOS 
 
As shown in the preceding section, ‘the foreclosure process’ contains several key 
junctures at which expenditures are either attenuated or escalate dramatically. As a 
result, there is not a single ‘cost of foreclosure’ but rather a range of costs associated 
with a variety of increasingly severe foreclosure scenarios. This section therefore 
illustrates the impact of failed loans on municipal service demand and expenditures by 
presenting seven empirically plausible scenarios.  
 
The scenarios, their estimated costs, and their impact on the municipal level foreclosure 
infrastructure are outlined in Figure D. In both the Figure and the text, scenarios are 
organized from least to most complex/costly. Depending on the details, each scenario 
draws on services provided by some share of the 15 separate City and County entities 
involved in the foreclosure process, and incurs between 4 and 18 distinct direct 
municipal costs. Detailed explanations of the methodology through which each cost 
element is calculated are presented in Appendix A of this report.  
 
Note that while the costs presented here reflect a comprehensive estimate of the direct 
municipal costs of foreclosure for alternative scenarios, they do not reflect the total 
social costs as defined earlier. In particular, measuring the indirect costs associated 
with the decline in home prices, and resulting decline in tax base goes beyond what is 
technically possible to estimate with any degree of precision. As noted earlier, however, 
in the extreme case of concentrated foreclosures, these losses range upward to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.  
 
Figure D: Summary of Municipal Costs for Alternative Foreclosure Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Scenario 
Number Characteristics
Direct Municipal 
Cost
Number of Agencies 
Involved
1 Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Never Vacant 27$                          5
2 Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Secured 430$                        7
3a Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured, DOAH 5,358$                     9
3b Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured, Housing Court 7,020$                     8
4a
Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured, DOAH, Modest 
Criminal Activity 5,673$                     10
4b
Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured, DOAH, Significant 
Criminal Activity 6,753$                     10
5a
Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured, Fast Track, Modest 
Criminal Activity 13,452$                   9
5b
Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured, Demo Court, 
Modest Criminal Activity 13,324$                   9
6
No Foreclosure, Vacant/Unsecured, Modest Criminal Activity, 
Structure Demolished 19,227$                   11
7 Severe case with Fire 34,199$                   12
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THE DIRECT COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE FORECLOSURE SCENARIOS 
 
Scenario 1: Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Never Vacant ($27) 
The minimalist scenario from a municipal expenditure perspective is one in which 
foreclose does not result in vacancy and the servicer covers any property taxes not paid 
by the failed borrower. Cook County is responsible for recordkeeping associated with 
default, registering the foreclosure sale and the name of the owners following the sale, 
and operating Chancery Court. Also included is the City’s Department of Housing’s 
nearly $1 million annual investment in foreclosure avoidance that is allocated across all 
foreclosures experienced in the City. Figure D shows that net direct expenditures for the 
City and County combined amount to $27 in this straightforward case. As with all costs 
estimates presented here, this one is conservative because it omits the indirect effects 
that even simple cases can have on neighbors and/or other third parties. Similarly, 
because eviction of an intransient former owner is not ‘typical,’ this cost is also excluded 
in this scenario. Including it would not only increase costs but bring in the Cook County 
Sheriff’s Office as an additional participant agency in the foreclosure process.  
 
Scenario 2: Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Secured ($430) 
This situation is somewhat more costly due to the impact of a period of vacancy, albeit a 
relatively unproblematic one in terms of municipal service consumption. The previous 
costs apply, to which are added expenses the City incurs maintaining infrastructure and 
manpower for vacancy reporting and building inspections. In Scenario 2 the vacant unit 
is properly secured and no code violations exist, indicating that the owner has 
registered it on the vacant property registry. The largest additional cost stems from the 
effort of the Department of Buildings (DOB) to conduct inspections and file reports of 
conditions in vacant properties. As costs grow, so do the number of municipal agencies 
involved. Even in this relatively simple situation, some seven agencies are involved – 
raising not only costs, but the need considerable in interagency coordination. Costs 
here remain modest in part because securing the home prevents undesirable uses, 
such as drug dealing, that costs upward of $1,000 each time police make arrests at the 
site. City losses are further limited here because the city saves thousands in boarding, 
court, and demolition expenses that are required in more complex situations. 
 
Scenario 3a/3b: Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured ($5,358/$7,020) 
When the unit is not only vacant but also ‘open,’ costs related to compelling the owner 
and/or noteholder secure the property - or to do so at City expense - accrue. These 
additional costs begin following the DOB’s inspection mentioned in Scenario 2. At this 
point the Department of Law (DOL) attempts to contact the owner regarding the code 
violation and need to secure the property. If the City is unable to find the owner and/or 
the owner is served notice but fails to secure the unit, the city will pay a contractor to 
board the home and issue a lien to cover its costs. Securing a building is notoriously 
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difficult because boarding is often removed by squatters, vandals, or criminals, as soon 
as it is put in place. Multiple re-boardings are not uncommon. The City must also pursue 
collection from the owner and others with an interest in the property either through the 
Department of Administrative Hearings or Housing Court. This process generates 
considerable costs associated with the preparation and adjudication of the case, which 
can range from $2,690 for Administrative Hearings (Scenario 3a) to $4,203 for the 
Housing Court (Scenario 3b). Operating these judicial venues also involves 
administrative expenses. The cost presented in Figure D assumes that there was only 
one judicial notification and three boarding liens. Raising the number of required 
notifications raises the total cost a minimum of $165 for each additional one (the $180 
fee for police time net of the $15 fee). 
 
Scenario 4a/4b: Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured, Criminal 
Activity ($5,673/$6,753) 
These scenarios, both extensions of 3a, introduce additional costs related to criminal 
activity.17 Scenario 4a assumes that such activity is relatively benign, such as squatting 
by homeless persons, vandalism, and perhaps drug use (as opposed to drug dealing). 
Such activity requires only that police visit the site periodically but not make arrests or 
be put at risk. As a result policing costs are for only a half hour visit, without back up. 
Our interviewee reported that three to four visits is typical so we use the midpoint of this 
range to produce and estimate of $315 for the 3.5 visits in this simple case. Scenario 4b 
assumes more severe criminal activity that requires police to call backup and make 
arrests of individuals involved in serious criminal activity. Costs in this latter case 
($1,080 for a single serious crime stop) are higher due to additional manpower 
requirements and longer time spent on scene and afterward. 
 
Scenario 5a/5b: Foreclosure, Sold at Auction, Vacant/Unsecured, Criminal 
Activity, Structure Demolished ($13,452/$13,324) 
Scenarios 5a and 5b are based on Scenarios 3a and 4a (i.e., effort to collect fines and 
fees goes through DOAH and the level of criminal activity is ‘typical’ as opposed to 
severe).18  These new scenarios differ from the earlier ones by introducing expenses 
associated by demolishing problem structures. Scenario 5a assumes demolition occurs 
through the Fast Track Demolition process where the City hires a contractor to wreck 
the building and issues a lien to cover the cost. In this case City expenses stem from 
notification requirements prior to demolition, as well as to the imperfect ability to collect 
the full amount on demo liens. In Scenario 5b the case is pursued in Demolition Court, 
requiring DOL to prepare and try a relatively complex case. The County incurs the cost 
of operating the court in which demolition cases are tried. One of the key cost 
                                                 
17 If the cases went to Housing Court the total for 5a and 5b would each be $1,563 higher (i.e., higher by the difference between 
the Administrative Hearings and Housing Court scenarios). 
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18 To find alternative combinations of these earlier strategies simply add $1,563 for the higher cost judicial venue and/or $1,080 
for each serious criminal event. 
increments in both Scenarios is the loss of the structure from the property tax roles. We 
estimate the resulting loss at $861 annually and assume the lot remains vacant for five 
years for a direct tax loss of $4,307. Ultimately, the cost estimates for each Scenario 
here are similar but the key components of those costs differs – in one case the 
expense associated with paying a for demolition and in the other court-related expenses. 
In addition, the timing differs, with demolition is accomplished far more quickly through 
Fast Track.  
 
Scenario 6: No Foreclosure, Vacant/Unsecured, Criminal Activity, Structure 
Demolished ($19,227) 
Scenario 6 assumes demolition occurs through Fast Track but adds complexity by 
making the property a ‘walkaway.’ As discussed in several places in this report, 
walkways are the source of immense problems for city residents, businesses, and 
neighborhoods because they provide spaces that exist without oversight, potentially in 
perpetuity. Further, no party with resources to remedy problems associated with the 
structure is legally bound to do so. In Scenario 6 the loan fails but the noteholder’s 
agent does not consummate the foreclosure process. In this situation, a variety of 
outstanding bills cannot be collected. Foremost among these are property taxes that 
often are unpaid at the time the ‘walkaway’ actually occurs. These technically remain 
the burden of the home’s owner who clearly does not have the ability to pay. As a result, 
uncollected taxes are ultimately put through a tax sale, at which time some share of the 
taxes are recouped. In addition, in its role as water provider the City incurs losses when 
the unpaid water balance is also ‘walked away’ from. The same principal applies to 
electricity and gas, though these losses are much smaller because the City taxes these 
services rather than providing them directly. Finally, because these properties are 
untended, they not only deteriorate but attract illegal dumping and require periodic 
outdoor maintenance such as mowing the weeds.  
 
Scenario 7: Severe Case with Fire ($34,199) 
In the event that it is not demolished, a ‘walkaway’ can impose an even greater 
municipal service burden. Serious criminal activity becomes more likely, trash removal 
costs are higher, the likelihood that utilities will be illegally reconnected increases 
dramatically, and a host of other problems arise or intensify, raising costs by thousands 
of dollars. In this case we assume a long period of vacant/open status, including a fire 
(estimated at a cost of $14,020) followed by eventually demolition of the remaining 
structure. It is important to realize that while this is the most serious case presented it 
does not reflect the absolute highest possible cost burden the City might incur on a 
failed mortgage. Such an actual worst case would be too idiosyncratic to be instructive 
but would include things like multiple instances of serious criminal activity, extreme 
levels of dumping and hence demand for trash removal, fire(s) that spread to adjacent 
homes and business, and greater foregone tax revenues.  
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Overall this section illustrates the direct cost of providing foreclosure infrastructure at 
the local level under a series of empirically common scenarios. As summarized in figure 
D, these activities are both complex – involving coordination across a number of City 
and County agencies even in the simplest cases – and costly. Even as large as they 
often are, direct costs reflect only a portion of the burden loan failures impose on 
municipalities. The next section summarizes these indirect costs.  
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INDIRECT COSTS MAGNIFY THE DIRECT MUNICIPAL COST 
 
The previous section showed that, depending on the nature and complexity of the 
foreclosure scenario, municipalities spend as much as $34,199 to provide foreclosure 
related services.  To the extent that foreclosed properties result in vacant and boarded 
up eyesores and/or become a magnet for crime they generate significant indirect costs 
by reducing the desirability of living and working in the area surrounding the property. 
This in turn acts as a deterrent for prospective home buyers and may even encourage 
existing neighbors to move out. Reduced desirability will eventually decrease (or reduce 
the rate of increase of) local home values. This slower rate of home price appreciation 
not only robs home owners in the area of their housing wealth, it also deprives the city 
of much needed tax revenue. 
 
As discussed more fully in Appendix B, it is difficult to quantify the indirect costs linked 
to the negative impacts that foreclosures and foreclosure related vacancies have on 
neighboring property values. Clearly, the extent to which serious problem properties 
flowing from mortgage foreclosures engender indirect costs depends on the degree to 
which they are concentrated in particular neighborhoods. A single foreclosure in an 
otherwise healthy neighborhood is certainly not a positive factor but likely has only 
modest effects on appreciation rates on surrounding properties. As the number of 
foreclosures in a single area mounts, however, the negative consequences increase 
rapidly.  
 
Consider the situation facing the 8300 Block of South Morgan Street in the 
Auburn/Gresham neighborhood depicted earlier (Figure B). As explained more fully in 
the Appendix B, the best available evidence suggests that the vacancy and resulting 
demolition of a foreclosed home on that block will generate significant downward 
pressure on home price appreciation. Moreover, existing studies on the topic suggest 
that the adverse impacts persist up to 450 feet from problem units. Yet even counting 
impacts on homes that are within a radius of 150 feet, in the Auburn/Gresham situation, 
as many as 13 homeowners would see the collective value of their homes decline by 
nearly $220,000.  
 
Nor are area homeowners the only losers. The blight associated with a neighborhood 
littered with vacant and boarded homes will limit the willingness of customers to shop at 
nearby stores, and make it more difficult for local area employers to attract workers. 
Moreover, the negative impact also extends to other entities with a financial interest in 
loans on other properties on this block. For example, the downward pressure on home 
prices reduces the value of the collateral that secures other mortgages in the area, just 
as it reduces the incentive for other mortgage borrowers to meet their mortgage 
payment obligations. As a result, foreclosures undermine the economic interests of 
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other mortgage investors, help stimulate more foreclosures, and further increase the 
social costs of concentrated foreclosures.  
 
SPENDING DOLLARS TO AVOID FORECLOSURE RELATED COSTS 
 
Once the foreclosure process starts, some municipal expenditures for foreclosure 
related services are unavoidable. As noted earlier, however, there are numerous 
opportunities for municipalities to devote resources in order to avoid even larger costs in 
the future. For example, the City’s Department of Housing spends nearly $1 million of its 
Community Development Block Grant funds working with community-based non-profit 
organizations to avoid costly foreclosures.19 Though this amount shows up as 
expenditure in the municipal budget, it generates substantial indirect benefits by 
avoiding future costs for the city, and their spillover effects on the distressed homebuyer 
and surrounding neighborhood.  
 
This example of ‘spending money to save money’ is a reminder that even though the 
municipal costs of a single foreclosure can run into the tens of thousands of dollars, 
there are numerous opportunities to reduce, if not entirely eliminating many of them. 
The last section of this report therefore discusses ways that municipalities - working in 
partnership with responsible lenders and committed community organizations - can 
develop initiatives that avoid foreclosures in the first instance and, when foreclosure is 
unavoidable, minimize the effects of foreclosure for the borrower, the lender, neighbors 
and the municipality. 
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19 See discussion of “Cost 4” in Appendix A. 
SECTION 4:  CREATING PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE 
FORECLOSURE ARENA 
 
Key developments in the US mortgage market have always been closely linked to the 
growth and evolution of public sector infrastructure designed to support mortgage 
origination and secondary market activities. At the federal level, this public infrastructure 
includes institutions such as the Federal Housing Administration, Ginnie Mae, Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System that blur the line between 
public and private sector activities. In their role as guardians of the rights and 
responsibilities of the owners of land and property, local governments also conduct a 
range of activities such as land and mortgage document registries that are fundamental 
to mortgage lending. Similarly, local courts play a key role in the mortgage foreclosure 
process. Finally when a foreclosure results in abandonment, other municipal agencies – 
including Police and Fire – are called into action.  
 
To address the rising costs and disruptions of growing foreclosures, municipalities, 
along with their industry and non-profit partners have much work to do. First and 
foremost, it is imperative that municipalities join with responsible mortgage industry and 
community leaders to work to reduce the incidence of poorly underwritten and/or 
fraudulent loans made in distressed neighborhoods. In addition, business, government 
and non-profit organizations can work cooperatively to: 1) Reform Key Elements of the 
Foreclosure Process; 2) Support Foreclosure Avoidance Efforts; and 3) Encourage 
Industry Participants to Pay Their Fair Share of Foreclosure Related Costs. Specific 
proposals are detailed below.  
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REFORM KEY ELEMENTS OF THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS 
 
The increase in nonprime foreclosures has tested the ability of local governments to 
effectively and efficiently provide foreclosure related services. As a result, this is an 
opportune time to streamline and better coordinate the work of the various municipal 
agencies involved in the foreclosure process. Effective examples of this type of 
coordination include Chicago’s Troubled Building Initiatives (discussed below) and the 
work done by Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago to address the problem of 
‘walkaways,’ and to identify and remedy ‘foreclosure hotspots.’ 
 
Streamline and Better Coordinate the Foreclosure Legal Process 
Public concern about the growing concentration of foreclosures in some urban 
neighborhoods provides an excellent opportunity for re-assessing state and local laws 
and regulation governing the foreclosure process. While it remains critical that 
borrowers be given every reasonable opportunity to cure a default, foreclosure statutes 
should recognize that the collective good – including the interests of neighbors and local 
businesses - is best served when the benefits of a speedy and predictable foreclosure 
process are seen to outweigh advantages individual borrowers reap through a sluggish 
process. Standardizing and updating foreclosure law with an eye to eliminating 
provisions that simply delay inevitable foreclosures while worsening their adverse 
impact on neighborhoods is an important element of regulatory reform.20 
 
Better coordination of the various steps in the foreclosure process is also essential. A 
good example of what can be achieved is the City of Chicago’s Troubled Building 
Initiatives. Building on its first incarnation (TBI1) focusing on multifamily buildings, the 
City has launched a second phase (TBI2) for single family buildings. Both programs are 
intended to coordinate city resources and activities across all agencies involved in order 
to bring about the best solution to the negative effects of problem buildings. The 
process begins with identification of available resources (e.g., laws, fines/fees, coercive 
mechanisms, and other signals). In some cases this can mean foreclosing on an 
existing municipal lien (e.g., for unpaid taxes, water, boarding or demolition) to 
accelerate the City’s ability to take control of the property. In others it means bringing 
administrative or judicial action against the lender and/or property owner to get their 
attention and force resolution of the situation. Rather than let foreclosure-related 
vacancies in single family homes linger, TBI2 helps to accelerate the process and in 
doing so minimize the adverse impact of mortgage failures on the neighborhoods, the 
City, and other stakeholders.  
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20 Michigan recently enacted comprehensive tax foreclosure reforms. For a discussion of how these reforms are enabling the 
City of Flint, Michigan better address issues relating its growing inventory of vacant and abandoned homes see: Daniel T. 
Kildee. 2004. Reusing Forgotten Urban Land: The Genesee County Urban Land Redevelopment Initiative. Housing Facts and 
Findings 6(2). 
Focus on Walkways – A Costly Breakdown of the Foreclosure Process 
While many buildings stuck in various stages of the foreclosure process deserve special 
attention, perhaps none are more deserving of special treatment than so called 
‘walkaways,’ or situations in which both the borrower and lender abandon their interest 
in the property (though legal interest typically remains with the borrower as s/he is often 
unaware that the lender has not completed the foreclosure).21 Problematically for local 
stakeholders, walkways leave behind a vacant building with title status that can take 
years to resolve. 
 
Through its HOPI initiative, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago is working with 
the City of Chicago and responsible lender partners to address the walkaway situation. 
One approach is to craft accelerated procedures to speed the transfer of potential 
walkways to the city (or a designated non-profit). Rapid transfer of distressed properties 
would not only reduce the City’s costs stemming from properties languishing in limbo, it 
would also enable the city to move more quickly to either demolish the structure and 
land bank the parcel, or rehab or otherwise redevelop the property as part of a 
neighborhood stabilization or revitalization effort. Whatever the details, there can be 
little doubt early intervention – before squatters and illicit activities arrive on the scene – 
would substantially reduce the social cost of foreclosure.  
 
Create a Special Foreclosure Hotspot Initiative 
Better overall coordination of activities and a special focus on the most troubled 
buildings and neighborhoods could be the first step in the creation of a ‘foreclosure 
hotspot protocol.’ This initiative identifies a series of steps designed to minimize the 
significant social and financial costs – including costs to city agencies – that result from 
extreme foreclosure levels. For example, municipal tax collection agencies could 
forbear on efforts to foreclose on tax liens against individual owner occupants residing 
in foreclosure hotspots if such efforts would allow the family to remain in their home.  
 
Alternatively, to the extent that the owner of a hotspot home has already vacated the 
property and decided not to contest the foreclosure, a municipality could work with 
lenders to accelerate the foreclosure process and speed transfer of the property to a 
new owner. Again, while it is important to protect the interests of low-income 
homeowners, in situations of uncontested foreclosures, quickly moving properties in 
troubled neighborhoods off the vacancy rolls can reduce foreclosure related costs that 
are now are borne by lenders, municipal governments, and area residents alike.22 
                                                 
21 Whether such actions themselves should be permitted at all is worth considering. In particular, having been party to a failed loan, 
the question is whether the lender should be permitted to abandon its interest the property, or instead be minimally be required to 
complete the foreclosure process, pay any outstanding liens against the property and/or turn the property over to the city.  
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22 For further discussion of ‘Hotspot Initiatives’ see William Apgar, and Mark Duda. 2004. Preserving Homeownership: 
Community-Development Implications of the New Mortgage Market. A report prepared for the Neighborhood Housing Services 
of Chicago. 
SUPPORT FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE INITIATIVES  
 
Innovative programs now in operation demonstrate that municipalities can productively 
partner with responsible mortgage industry representatives and community based 
organizations to form new partnerships that address the challenges posed by the 
growth in nonprime foreclosures. This section identifies some approaches that can 
minimize the adverse impacts of these foreclosures.  
 
Help Servicers Make Contact with Borrowers in Distress 
Recognizing that foreclosure imposes costs on borrowers, lenders, neighbors and 
municipalities alike, most lenders and their servicers go to great lengths to reach out to 
delinquent borrowers. Yet, the high cost of maintaining contact with distressed 
borrowers limits the effectiveness of many standard approaches. In the nonprime 
market, it is very common for delinquent loans to move to foreclosure without the 
borrower being made aware of possible loan modifications and workout options, not to 
mention publicly available foreclosure avoidance programs.  
 
The pilot partnership between Homecomings Financial Network23 and Neighborhood 
Housing Services of Chicago (NHSC) is a promising way forward. Homecomings is 
betting that some borrowers that are unwilling to talk to the company directly will instead 
be willing to talk with the NHSC. Upon contacting NHSC, these borrowers are offered 
the option of independent credit counseling thru the Credit Counseling Resource Center 
(CCRC) or speaking with a Homecomings representative. The partnership allows the 
organizations to work together to arrive at appropriate workouts, and provides 
borrowers with a trusted advisor to guide them in what can be an intimidating process. 
 
Initial results of this approach point to success. Although it was not possible to avoid 
foreclosure in every instance, early experience suggests that as many as half of all 
program participants achieved ‘successful outcomes’ (defined as any resolution of the 
situation that did not result in the property becoming vacant and abandoned). These 
successes resulted from NHSC staff interventions with lenders, accessing private and 
public loan/grant resources (e.g. the Neighborhood Lending Program or Homeless 
Prevention Fund), or refinancing through NHSC or a partner lender in order to achieve a 
more sustainable mortgage for the owner.  
 
Connecting Borrowers to Trusted Sources of Credit Counseling 
Effective credit counseling can literally be the difference between saving and losing a 
home. When done poorly, however, counseling is a waste of time and money. When 
done unscrupulously, it makes a bad situation worse. To help consumers gain access to 
legitimate and effective credit counseling services, the City of Chicago has begun 
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23 The servicing arm of GMAC-RFC. 
providing foreclosure avoidance information through its 311 System, a non-emergency 
city call center equipped to receive inquiries about city services and to direct callers to 
appropriate city agencies or delegate agencies. The Chicago 311 program builds on 
previous counseling efforts developed by the Credit Counseling Resource Center 
(CCRC), an alliance of three credit counseling agencies with a national network formed 
to “help distressed borrowers restore financial balance to their lives.”  
 
To help build public trust in the 311 approach, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley led a 
highly visible campaign to introduce the system and encourage distressed borrowers to 
seek help before it becomes too late. Callers have the opportunity to receive counseling 
from the Credit Counseling Resource Center (CCRC), a national alliance of HUD 
Certified Housing Counseling agencies operated by the Homeownership Preservation 
Foundation, and then be put in contact with the loan servicer to explore a potential 
workout or be referred to other available local resources or assistance if appropriate. 
The goal is to help distressed borrowers find the best way to address a temporary 
financial crisis, to mitigate the downside effects of a permanent income reduction, or to 
devise strategies to better manage their credit and/or to avoid foreclosure. Half of the 
credit counseling is paid for by lenders that have signed on to the program, while the 
City picks up the tab for the customers of others that have not joined the effort.  
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ENCOURAGE ALL INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS TO PAY THEIR FAIR 
SHARE OF PERFORMANCE RELATED COSTS 
 
Failure to account for the full social cost of nonprime lending not only imposes an unfair 
burden on the taxpayers who fund municipal services but is also economically inefficient. 
This failure also enables less than scrupulous lenders to overextend credit to the most 
risky and foreclosure prone borrowers. While the basic theory of risk-based pricing is 
economically sound, it works to efficiently allocate mortgage capital only if the expected 
risks are actually priced into the deal. In many instances, this is not the case.  
 
It is critically important to understand that the failure to price loans based on realistic 
estimates of their total costs helps some industry players to successfully use a ‘cut and 
run’ approach. By not bearing the full cost of their activities, less capable and/or less 
responsible lenders are able to thrive in situations where their business practices are 
not economically viable. This business model suggests that they will only secure a 
property or aggressively seek to resolve the delinquency in situations where there is 
clear private economic gain for doing so. For example, such a business strategy may 
lead some lenders to ‘walkaway’ from buildings in foreclosure, leaving behind vacant 
buildings in a legal limbo that often takes years to sort out.24  
 
It is in the best interest of all responsible parties to insure that nonprime mortgage 
lending occurs only when loan pricing reflects the true social costs and benefits of these 
inherently riskier loans. Absent such action, competitive pressures will result in a race to 
the bottom as some lenders lower their standards to extend their reach into ever more 
risky and vulnerable urban neighborhoods. In such a race, market share will flow to 
those willing to under price their product at origination only later leave behind a whole 
host of costs that must be paid by neighbors and municipalities left to pick up the tab. 
This not only places undo stress on municipalities and neighborhoods but, as negative 
spillovers diminish house price appreciation, concentrated foreclosures undermine the 
value of outstanding loans originated, serviced, and owned by all lenders, even the 
most responsible nonprime market participants. 
 
Raise the Fees on Specific Court and Municipal Foreclosure Related Services 
As the provider of basic governmental services, many municipalities are rethinking how 
best to set fees. While this obviously is driven in part by the need to raise additional 
local revenue, it reflects the notion that local taxpayers should not be expected to pay 
for the provision of services that largely benefit specific and identifiable private parties. 
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24 In a recent paper, Duncan Kennedy discusses two approaches to lending: the ‘high road’ and the ‘low road,’ and how 
regulatory policy can help to reinforce the competitive advantage of “high road” market participants over “low road” players. 
See Duncan Kennedy, (2004). “Cost Benefit Analysis of Debtor Protection Rules in Sub-Prime Market Default Situations,” a 
paper produced for Building Assets, Building Credit: A Symposium on Improving Financial Services in Low-Income 
Communities, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
For example, as part of the Fast Track Demolition Process, the City is obligated to make 
owners aware of its intent to demolish a building. These notices are designed to protect 
the interests of delinquent borrower and foreclosing agent, yet net of a modest service 
fee, they cost the city $165 to issue.  
 
Just as local government is rethinking the fee structures in many areas, it makes sense 
that local governments should identify and correctly price the activities comprising the 
municipal foreclosure infrastructure.25 This won’t be easy. Note that prior to this study, 
there was no systematic enumeration of the many municipal costs associated with 
foreclosures. Moreover, some may worry that raising fees paid by lenders – especially 
nonprime lenders – will only further raise the costs of nonprime credit and harm future 
credit impaired borrowers. While this concern merits attention, the alternative argument 
is simple. The current implicit subsidies now provided by municipalities that are forced 
to assume a substantial portion of the cost of foreclosures are no substitute for an 
explicit policy to subsidize lending, or otherwise assist low-income borrowers. For 
example, to the extent that a locality could capture additional revenue by more 
appropriately pricing foreclosure services, that revenue could be used to pay the city 
costs for implementing promising new foreclosure avoidance activities targeted at lower-
income borrowers in distress. 26  
 
Create an Industry Fund to Help Offset Municipal Costs of Foreclosure 
While in theory correctly pricing municipal services will promote efficient resource 
allocation, in many instances collecting these fees may be more costly than the revenue 
generated. For example, the City of Chicago pays a contractor on average some $900 
each time it boards and otherwise secures a vacant home, and issues a lien to cover 
the costs. While effectively securing properties reduces the costs of police and fire 
services associated with vacant properties, and the exposure to dangerous and 
otherwise unpleasant conditions by neighbors, as many as half of the liens go 
uncollected. In some instances, there is no responsible party capable of paying the lien. 
In other cases, the cost of collecting the lien may exceed the value of the dollars 
returned. 
 
                                                 
25 To draw a parallel with another public policy issue in which government expenditures have been used to justify regulation, if 
cigarette smoking imposed no costs on government, then tobacco sales would be regulated differently than they are in world 
where government incurs substantial smoking-related expenses though its Medicare and Medicaid programs. That is, anti-
smoking regulations are justified based on the fact that smoking imposes costs on government itself, and not just on the need 
to limit the negative external impacts of smoking on non-smokers. 
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26 To draw a parallel with another public policy issue in which government expenditures have been used to justify regulation, if 
cigarette smoking imposed no costs on government, then tobacco sales would be regulated differently than they are in world 
where government incurs substantial smoking-related expenses though its Medicare and Medicaid programs. That is, anti-
smoking regulations are justified based on the fact that smoking imposes costs on government itself, and not just on the need 
to limit the negative external impacts of smoking on non-smokers. 
One strategy for helping municipalities address the rising costs linked to nonprime 
foreclosures builds on and extends previous industry proposals to help assume some of 
the cost burden linked with predatory lending. For example, in the Fall of 2003, the 
Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending – a leading national organization representing 
the interests of some nonprime lenders – proposed that Congress require nonprime 
lenders to pay a reasonable fee into a central fund when they originate a mortgage.27 
This fee could be used as a significant supplementary funding mechanism for state and 
community based education programs. A simple extension of this fee concept would be 
to use the funding generated to defray the municipal costs associated with foreclosure, 
to support state and local efforts to streamline the foreclosure process, to expand the 
capacity for localities to launch foreclosure avoidance initiatives, and in other ways to 
reduce the overall financial and social costs of foreclosure. 
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27 Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending (2003), “ National Standards for Mortgage Lending Gain Momentum: Industry 
Outlines ‘Reasonable Compromise Proposals,’” press release dated November 17, 2003 
CONCLUSION 
 
Recognizing that they will inevitably bear some of the costs of foreclosure, 
municipalities must also be prepared to use their own community development 
resources to support foreclosure avoidance strategies that will both help families in 
distress and reduce their own overall exposure to foreclosure related costs. While well 
targeted municipal expenditures for foreclosure avoidance efforts can reap tremendous 
rewards in terms of avoided costs, it is also important that mortgage industry 
participants pay their fair share of foreclosure related costs as well. To accomplish this, 
municipalities should carefully review the costs associated with providing foreclosure 
related services and, when appropriate, pass these costs along in the form of higher 
user fees. In addition, municipalities can work cooperatively with industry leaders to 
ensure that a greater share of municipal costs is recovered from user fees or out of the 
proceeds of the foreclosure sale. 
 
Finally, there are numerous opportunities for municipalities to increase the efficiency of 
their provision of foreclosure related services, and evaluate existing laws and 
regulations that may inadvertently add to the overall social cost of foreclosure. Together 
these actions will serve to reduce the municipal costs of foreclosure and help preserve 
the homeownership gains that have resulted from the expansion in access to credit to 
higher risk borrowers.  
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APPENDIX A:  METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED TO GENERATE 
MUNICIPAL DIRECT COST ESTIMATES 
 
 
Figure E: Summary Table for Costs and Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Components Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3a Scenario 3b Scenario 4a Scenario 4b
 
F
 
 
 
 Foreclosure x x x x x x
Unit Sold at Auction x x x x x x
Vacant x x x x x
Unsecured x x x x
Legal Venue
Admin. 
Hearing
Housing 
Court
Admin. 
Hearing
Admin. 
Hearing
Criminal Activity modest significant
Other
Expense 
Number Direct Costs City/County
1 Lis Pendens  Filed county (13)$             (13)$             (13)$             (13)$             (13)$             (13)$              
2 Operate Chancery Court county (43)$             (43)$             (43)$             (43)$             (43)$             (43)$              
3 Register Sale & New Owner county (13)$             (13)$             (13)$             (13)$             (13)$             (13)$              
4
DOH Delegate Agency Funding for 
Foreclosure Prevention city 96$              96$              96$              96$              96$              96$               
5
Compliant Monitoring/ Intake (e.g.,  
311, Buildings & Police Dept.) city 3$                3$                3$                3$                3$                 
6 Filing city 364$            364$            364$            364$            364$              
7 Vacant Buildings Registry city 36$              36$              36$              36$              36$               
8 Serving Notice to Secure Vacant Unit city 715$            715$            715$            715$              
9 Issue Lien city 1,445$          1,445$          1,445$          1,445$           
10
Dept. of Law Prepares Case for 
Administrative Hearings city 2,690$          2,690$          2,690$           
11
Administering Department of 
Administrative Hearings city 78$              78$              78$               
12
Dept. of Law Prepares Case for 
Housing Court city 4,203$          
13 Administering Housing Court county 228$            
14 Police Visit city 315$            315$              
15 Police Enter Property & Make Arrests city 1,080$           
16
Dept. of Buildings Contacts Owner re: 
Demolition city
17
Dept. of Buildings Sends Notice of 
Immanent Demolition city
18
Demolition: Vendor Wrecks Unit at City 
Expense; City Issues Lien city
19 Direct Property Tax Losses county
20
Dept. of Law Prepares & Tries Case in 
Demolition  Court city
21 Administering Demolition Court county
22 Unpaid Property Taxes Not Recovered county
23 Utility Taxes Foregone city
24 Water Bill Unpaid city
25
Streets and Sanitation Mows 
Lawn/Removes Trash city
26 Fire Department city
27$           430$         5,358$      7,020$      5,673$      6,753$       
Scenarios 
Direct Cost Total
Costs     
 
igure E continues on next page. 
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Figure E (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Scenario Components Scenario 5a Scenario 5b Scenario 6 Scena
Foreclosure x x
Unit Sold at Auction x x
Vacant x x x x
Unsecured x x x x
Legal Venue Fast track
Demolition 
Court Fast track
Demol
Cou
Criminal Activity modest modest modest seve
Other x
Expense 
Number Direct Costs City/County
1 Lis Pendens  Filed county (13)$             (13)$             (13)$             $          
2 Operate Chancery Court county (43)$             (43)$             
3 Register Sale & New Owner county (13)$             (13)$             
4
DOH Delegate Agency Funding for 
Foreclosure Prevention city 96$              96$              96$              $           
5
Compliant Monitoring/ Intake (e.g.,  
311, Buildings & Police Dept.) city 3$                3$                3$                $          
6 Filing city 364$            364$            364$            $           
7 Vacant Buildings Registry city 36$              36$              36$              $           
8 Serving Notice to Secure Vacant Unit city 715$            715$            715$            $           
9 Issue Lien city 1,445$          1,445$          1,445$          $           
10
Dept. of Law Prepares Case for 
Administrative Hearings city
11
Administering Department of 
Administrative Hearings city
12
Dept. of Law Prepares Case for 
Housing Court city
13 Administering Housing Court county
14 Police Visit city 315$            315$            315$            $           
15 Police Enter Property & Make Arrests city $           
16
Dept. of Buildings Contacts Owner re: 
Demolition city 165$            165$            
17
Dept. of Buildings Sends Notice of 
Immanent Demolition city 75$              75$              
18
Demolition: Vendor Wrecks Unit at City 
Expense; City Issues Lien city 6,000$          6,000$          
19 Direct Property Tax Losses county 4,307$          4,307$          4,307$          $           
20
Dept. of Law Prepares & Tries Case in 
Demolition  Court city 5,884$          $           
21 Administering Demolition Court county 228$            $           
22 Unpaid Property Taxes Not Recovered county 506$            $           
23 Utility Taxes Foregone city 51$              $           
24 Water Bill Unpaid city 162$            $           
25
Streets and Sanitation Mows 
Lawn/Removes Trash city 5,000$          $           
Fi D t t it $
Scenarios 
Costs     
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Cost 1: Maintaining Lis Pendens Filing Infrastructure  
When delinquencies become sufficiently problematic that lenders, servicers, or their 
representatives become concerned about the ability of the borrower to cure, they 
complement their efforts to cure the loan with parallel steps to prepare for the loan’s 
failure by initiating foreclosure proceedings. In Illinois, initiating this latter process 
means filing a formal notice of default (lis pendens) with the county records office. 
Responsibility for this function lies with the office of the Cook County Recorder of Deeds. 
In order to compute the cost of operating the County’s lis pendens filing operations we 
took the total 2004 appropriations for the Recorder of Deeds ($18.7m) and divided it by 
the share of documents registered annually constituted by foreclosure initiations (0.9 
percent). The resulting $215,835 can then be divided by the number of lis pendens filed 
annually (15,811 in 2003) to determine the per-event cost ($14).  
 
This cost is then reduced by the $26.50 fee charged to filers to arrive at our final 
estimate which shows the County ‘earning’ $13 per filing. Because $13 is small in 
relation to many of the other costs in this report we do not make additional effort to 
determine whether this apparent ‘profit’ is a profit in actual fact. Our assumption is that 
potential small errors with our method are random and thus cancel each other out, 
providing estimates that are, on aggregate order of magnitude correct and serve to 
accurately illustrate conditions in the City. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Cook County Recorder of Deeds 2004 Appropriation 18,701,796$       
Total filings, Cook County, 2003 15,811
Lis pendens share of annual records filed 0.012 215,835$        
Expenditure per filing 14$                
Filing Charge (26.5)$            
Net per-filing cost to Cook County (13)$           
 
 
Cost 2: Operating Chancery Court  
Because Illinois is a judicial foreclosure state, all cases must go through Chancery 
Court. Though foreclosures are not the only type of cases heard by the court, they are 
the majority. The challenges in computing this cost are first to include all elements of the 
cost of administering Chancery Court and second to attribute the correct share of the 
overall Chancery Court costs to residential mortgage foreclosures.  
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The table below details our response to the first challenge, listing each cost element for 
operating the Court. We calculate the Chancery Court share of the budgets of the four 
County agencies involved using several different methods of proportioning, depending 
on what data were availability (as indicated in the table below). To meet the second 
challenge we used a figure for the share of Chancery Court Cases that are foreclosure 
related (62.5 percent) provided by one of our interviewees). Since all components of this 
cost are shares of Cook County Budget lines pertaining to Chancery Court, each the 
total cost outlay for Chancery Court is multiplied by the same percentage to yield a 
roughly $3.4 million overall cost, which can be divided by the number of cases (15,009 
in 2003) to produce a cost estimate of $228 per case. This is offset, however, by the 
$271 court fee, meaning that the City nets some $43 per case processed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Clerk of the Circuit Court, County Wide Operations 2004 appropriation $12,951,965
Chancery Court portion (based on share of salaries) 0.210 $2,721,149
Office of the Chief Judge, 2004 Appropriation 42,577,165$       
Chancery Court portion (Chancery case filings as percent of all filings, 2003) 0.037 1,573,469$     
Court Services, 2004 Appropriation 98,274,188$       
Daly Center portion (based on share of all salaries) 0.134 13,160,373$   
Chancery Court portion of Daley Center Cases 0.037 486,934$        
Judiciary, 2004 appropriation 18,663,917$       
Chancery Court portion (chancery case filings as percent of all filings, 2003) 0.037 689,738$        
Total expenditures $5,471,290
Foreclosure portion of Chancery total (share of cases) 0.625 $3,419,556
Foreclosure cases (Chancery cases * foreclosure share) 15,009               0.625
Per case cost $228
Chancery Court fee charged ($271)
Net per-case cost of chancery court cases (43)$            
 
Cost 3: Registering Sales (Cook County)  
Like the lis pendens filing, registering sales is an activity of the Cook County Recorder 
of Deeds. Selling a property through the foreclosure process triggers the filing of two 
documents, the first of which records the sale outcome and the second the new owner. 
In order to estimate the number of documents filed annually we therefore doubled the 
number of foreclosures completed in 2003 (9,958) and used it to calculate a share of 
the department’s overall activity level (1.45 percent). Multiplying this by the 2004 
budgetary allocation for the Cook County Recorder of Deeds and dividing the resulting 
number ($271,872) by the number of recordings yields a per-event expenditure of $14, 
the same as in Cost 1. This cost is offset by the $26.50 filing fee for a net gain of $13 for 
the City. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Cook County Recorder of Deeds 2004 Appropriation 18,701,796$       
Total completion & sale documents registered 19,916
Share of annual record filings comprised by sale and new owner registry 0.0145 271,872$        
Expenditure per filing 14$                
Filing Charge (26.5)$            
Net per-filing cost to Cook County (13)$           
 
 
Cost 4: DOH Delegate Agency Foreclosure Funding  
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In order to address the foreclosure problems it faces, the Department of Housing 
partners with CBOs (‘delegate agencies’). These agencies (e.g., Neighborhood Housing 
Services of Chicago and the National Training and Information Center) provide 
homeownership and credit counseling, supply legal assistance, and conduct research 
on foreclosure issues. In 2004 the total amount supplied to these activities was 
$953,550. Spreading this over each foreclosure recorded in the city (9,958) yields an 
expense of $96 per foreclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Counseling, Legal Assiatnce, Research 359,800$            
Hoem ownership Preservation Loans 593,750$            
Total delegate agency funding of foreclosure avoidance 953,550$        
Number of foreclosures 9958
Expenditure per event 96$             
 
Cost 5: Intake of Vacant Building Complaints  
In addition to the standard channels for vacancy reporting there are dozens of 
idiosyncratic ways that vacant buildings come to the attention of DOB. The most 
standardized of these, however, is through the City’s 311 reporting system. Our 
interviewee the Office of Emergency Management and Communications, where 311 is 
housed, put the per-call cost for abandoned building reports at $1.50 per call (based on 
internal study of process efficiencies at 311). Because the 311 intake mechanism is the 
most efficient way that complaints can be referred to DOB, the $1.50 figure is surely 
below the average intake cost of all vacant building intake, and is therefore doubled to 
reflect the lower efficiency of other methods, with the resulting $3.00 estimate still likely 
conservative. 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
311 per-call cost $1.50
Double cost to account for 311's efficiency relative to other methods $3.00
Expenditure per event $3  
 
Cost 6: Department of Buildings Inspections and Inspection Report Filing  
DOB inspections staff spend a significant amount of time locating and then inspecting 
properties, filing the necessary administrative documents regarding their findings and, in 
some cases, presenting these findings in court. To calculate hourly wages, we began 
with the salary for the median Building Inspector in the Hazardous Building Clearance 
section of the DOB budget. We then increased this $59,640 by the ratio of fringe 
benefits as a share of salary in DOB (38 percent), yielding a total compensation for the 
median Building Inspector of $82,530. Dividing this figure by 1,815 (the number of hours 
an average American works each week according the International Labor Organization) 
yields an hourly wage of just under $45. One event (i.e., one day of work), therefore 
costs the City $364. 
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expense cost/amount multiplier total
Building inspector salary (median) $59,640
Ratio of fringe to salary 0.38380353
Building Inspector Salary and Fringe (median) 82,530$          
Hourly rate 45$                
One day at hourly rate 45$                    8 364$              
Expenditure per event 364$          
 
Cost 7: Vacant Building Registry  
At DOB there is not a specific staff person assigned to manage the vacant building 
registry. Rather it is done on an ad hoc basis by a variety of the Department’s 
employees. In order to generate a cost estimate we were therefore required to make 
several assumptions about the level of the staff person involved and the amount of time 
the process takes. We resolved these issues by assuming that the average staffer 
would be a Building Inspector and that, all told, it takes three hours to add a unit to the 
registry, issue the notices for public posting, instruct the owner or owner’s agent on 
requirements for proper posting, and conduct subsequent file updates associated with 
the property. In estimate this cost we use the same hourly rate for Building Inspectors 
as in the previous expense (just over $45) and multiply it by 3 hours for a total of $136. 
This reduced by the vacant building registry fee of $100 for a net cost of $36 per event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Building inspector hourly rate 45$                
Three hours at hourly rate 45$                    3 136$              
Registry fee 100$              
Expenditure per event 36$             
 
Cost 8: Serving Notices to Owners to Secure Building  
The process of service can be simple or complex depending on factors such as whether 
the party being served is locally based or out of state and whether public notification is 
required (cases where one or more parties cannot be located). Our interviewee at the 
DOL, which is responsible for preparing and serving these notices, estimates the 
Department’s out-of pocket cost at $550 per event. This estimate understates the actual 
cost, however, because DOL does not pay the Police Officers that actually serve the 
papers on code violations.  
 
We therefore augment the $550 figure by the hourly rate for policing provided by one of 
our interviewees ($180) and conservatively assume that it takes one hour to achieve 
service (requiring three attempts before service is successful is “very typical” according 
to our interviewee). Adding to the $550 from DOL yields a total of $730 per event. This 
is offset by a $15 summons fee, yielding a final cost per event of $715. 
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expense cost/amount multiplier total
DOL cost per notification $550
Police cost (1 hour) 180$              
Expenditure per event 730$              
Summons fee 15$                
Net expenditure per event 715$           
 
Cost 9: Net Boarding Costs 
Boarding not done by the owner is performed by contractors at City expense. For a 
typical single family home this cost runs around $900. Because the City issues a lien, 
however, in some cases this cost is recovered. In addition, recovery time can easily 
require 24 months, during which the City incurs an opportunity cost on the capital it has 
tied up in the process. This reduces the value of the 50 percent of funds that it recoups 
directly by an additional 7 percent over the 24 months. Losses on the average boarding 
are therefore the original $900 charge less the share of recovered liens and adjusted for 
losses due to opportunity cost. Most units are boarded multiple times, however, so our 
final figure of $1,445 reflects an estimate of three boardings per foreclosure proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Cost of boarding advanced by City $900
Share of boarding liens recouped 0.50
Average cost per event 450$              
Average recovered amount after accounting for 7 percent opportunity cost 0.07 419$              
Average net cost of boarding 482$              
Number of boardings per vacancy 3
Expenditure per event 1,445$        
 
Cost 10: Preparing and Adjudicating Case in Administrative Hearing  
There are three costs (Cost 10, 12, and 20) associated with DOL preparing cases for 
different legal venues (Administrative Hearings, Housing Court, and Demolition Court). 
Though for the most part the same attorneys do not work on all types of cases, all are 
City employees, and our method costs units of effort equally across the three venues. 
The cost of preparing a case for each venue therefore varies only by the amount of time 
involved.  
 
In constructing the standard effort measure we use the costs for attorneys in the 
Demolition Legal Services section of DOL, where the median attorney salary is $78,576. 
Because support staff play prominent roles in the legal profession we also include work 
by paralegals, clerks, and legal secretaries in our overall hourly cost of effort measure. 
Adding in these other salaries at the median level and adjusting for the additional 36.6 
percent cost of fringe benefits yields a number that can be divided by the annual 
number of hours worked (1,815) to arrive at an hourly wage for the team of $168. 
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For Administrative Hearings, the typical foreclosure-related case involves 4-5 court 
dates and between 12 and 20 hours of preparation and court time according to our 
respondents. We use the mid point of this range, 16 hours, as our hours multiplier to get 
a per event cost of $2,690 to prepare and try a case in Administrative Hearings. This is 
offset slightly by the $50 fee charged in these cases to produce a final cost of $2,640. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Median attorney (Assistant Corporation Cousel) salary 78,576$             
Median paralegal salary 43,104$             
Median legal secretary salary 53,250$             
Median clerk salary 48,522$             
Subtotal - salaries 223,452$        
Ratio of salaries to fringe 0.36557792
Annual cost of fringe benfits for legal team 81,689$          
Total annual compensation for legal team 305,141$        
Hourly rate for legal team 168$              
Hours of effort needed 16
Total cost per Administrative Hearing 2,690$           
Fee charged per hearing 50$                
Expenditure per event 2,640$        
 
 
Cost 11: Administering the Department of Administrative Hearings  
As noted earlier, DOAH’s Building Hearings Division is the City’s preferred forum for 
adjudicating code violation issue when the total owed is less than $50,000. In order to 
determine the cost of administering this section we use Building Hearings Division’s 
share of total salary costs (16 percent) and apply this to the overall budget ($6.1 million), 
yielding $975,040. Because not all hearings in the Building Hearings Division are 
related to vacancy code violations we further reduce this by multiplying by 2 percent, the 
vacancy code violation share of all Building Hearings. Dividing this by the number of 
vacancy-related cases (250 annually according to our respondent in DOAH) yields a 
per-hearing cost of $78.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Total DOAH 2004 Budget $6,111,923
Building Hearings Division share (based on share of salaries) 0.16
Building Hearings share of overall DOAH 2004 budget 975,040$        
Share of Building Hearings related to vacany code violations issuess 0.02
Funds necessary to operate vacancy code violations hearings 19,501$          
Number of cases 250
Expenditure per event 78$             
 
Cost 12: Preparing and Trying Case in Housing Court  
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As noted above, we use the same hourly figure in Cost 10 for the legal effort measure. 
Housing Court cases are more difficult to try because they involve more dangerous 
structures, the City is more often seeking injunctive relief, and because buildings can be 
ordered vacated and put into receivership, all of which require additional legal 
machinations relative to an Administrative Hearings case. According to our interviewee 
at DOL, the “typical case with no complications” requires roughly 20 hours, though as 
much as 100 hours is not uncommon. Due to the vastly different potential costs of these 
two scenarios we use a figure of 25 hours for the ‘average’ case. Multiplying the hourly 
figure by 25 yields a per-case cost of just over $4,200. 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Hourly rate for legal team 168$              
Hours of effort needed 25
Expenditure per event 4,203$        
 
 
Cost 13: Administering Housing Court  
Conceptually, the costs of administering housing court are similar across the branches 
of civil court involved in this report (e.g., clerking, court services, and the judiciary). We 
therefore use the same numbers for operating expenses across the three cost figures 
(Costs 2, 13, and 20). Where the Housing and Demolition Court differ from Chancery is 
in the court fees assessed, with the former having fees generally half as much as the 
latter. Because government agencies are not assessed fees, however, the offset to 
costs incurred is zero for Housing and Demo Court. Our estimated cost of administering 
each of them is therefore equal to the pre-offset figure of $228 from Cost 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Chancery Court per event cost 228$              
Expenditure per event 228$           
 
Cost 14: Routine Police Visit  
Policing is one of the key municipal interventions necessitated by the foreclosure and 
vacancy processes. It is also one of the most common due to the repetitive nature of 
many minor crimes such as squatting and vandalism. Our cost estimate uses an 
estimate of the hourly cost of policing of $180 that was provided by an interviewee in the 
Department. A single visit where no major problems occur typically takes half an hour 
so the per visit cost is $90. Total cost is therefore driven by the number of times police 
must visit the unit to deal with these misdemeanor-type issues, which our interviewee 
put at 3-4 times per vacant building, though many are much higher. We use the average 
of these two figures and multiply by the $90 cost figure to get a per-unit cost for the 3.5 
visits of $315. 
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expense cost/amount multiplier total
Cost per half hour call $90
Total number of calls 3.5
Total cost per vacant unit 315$              
Expenditure per event 315$          
 
Cost 15: Police Make Arrests  
Often police officers called to vacant buildings detect more serious levels of criminal 
activity that require arrests. In such cases more personnel are involved and the process 
takes longer, pushing costs up accordingly. In a typical version of this scenario, two 
arresting officers spend two hours on-site and doing related follow up and paperwork, 
and four backup officers spend half an hour on-site. All of this time is valued at the 
$180/hour figure discussed in the previous cost description. The arresting officers’ total 
is therefore $720 and the backup officers’ total is $360, for an aggregate cost per event 
of $1,080. We assume that this happens only once for a ‘problem case’ but some 
vacant buildings clearly exist as sites of repeated drug and gang activity that require 
multiple arrests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Cost per officer per hour $180
Number of hours spent by arresting officers 2
Total costs per arresting officer $360
Number of arresting oficers 2
Arresting officer subtotal $720
Non-arresting officer cost (half hour) $90
Number of non-arrestign officers 4
Non-arresting officer subtotal $360
Total policing cost for arrest event 1,080$           
Expenditure per event 1,080$        
 
 
Cost 16: Serving Initial Notice of Demolition  
The City is obligated to make owners aware of its intent to demolish a building at two 
points in the Fast Track process. These notices are typically served by police officers, 
so we use the hourly policing cost in the two previous costs ($180/hour) in calculating 
this City expense. Because multiple visits are often required we use a conservative one 
hour estimate of the time required to serve the notice. This is offset by a $15 service fee 
for a net cost of $165.  
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Legal notice served by DOL $180
Summons fee $15
Net expenditure per event 165$           
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Cost 17: Serving Notice of Imminent Demolition 
The second notice informs interested parties that demolition in imminent. Cost are the 
same as the previous expense except for the fact that we assume only one half hour is 
required for service because contact information has been confirmed via the preceding 
service. Again the $15 offset fee applies so the cost of $90 per half hour is reduced to 
$75. 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Legal notice served by police on behalf of DOL $180 0.5 $90
Service fee $15
Expenditure per event 75$             
 
 
Cost 18: Demolition of Unit at City Expense 
In cases where the City demolishes homes the actual work is done by contractors that 
bid to do the job. Bids are obviously determined by the difficulty of the job (e.g., wood 
frame homes costing less to tear down than brick). Single family home costs run roughly 
from $5,000 to $20,000 but we use a figure closer to the lower end of the range 
($10,000) based on an examination of actual bids that indicates that $7,000-$12,000 is 
typical.  
 
In order to recover the cash outlay, the City issues a lien on the property. These liens 
are sometimes recovered in cash, sometimes by foreclosing on the lien and taking 
ownership of the property (this can yield less than the amount owed), and sometimes 
not at all. Staffing constraints limit DOL to actively pursuing about 250 of liens at any 
one time, meaning that this activity must be prioritized. Properties whose values are 
most likely to cover City costs or those in locations that have strategic importance given 
the City’s redevelopment goals are pursued first, leaving a revolving ‘passive collection’ 
pool of about 5,000 liens that persists over time. 
 
The existence of these two pools makes estimating the share of recovered liens difficult. 
Collection is somewhere near 90 percent on the high priority pool (though even on 
these the City incurs the opportunity cost on its capital tied up while pursuing 
foreclosure and then reselling the property, processes that take several years to 
complete), but others may languish unpaid forever. Due to the combined losses from 
opportunity cost and complete non-payment we estimate use a value for current dollar 
lien recovery of 40 percent, making the average amount recovered on a $10,000 
demolition $6,000. 
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expense cost/amount multiplier total
Cost of single family detached home demolition $10,000
Likelihood of lien recovery (including opportunit costs) 0.4
Average amount recovered $4,000
Expenditure per event 6,000$        
 
Cost 19: Direct Tax Loss from Demolition 
The direct property tax loss due to demolition (as different from non-payment of property 
taxes) is due to the assessed value of the structure being removed from the tax roles. 
The City loses the ability to collect this revenue until the property is redeveloped, often a 
long period of non-use. To compute the amount of these losses we take the median 
home price in the lower-income neighborhood of Auburn/Gresham ($167,440) and 
assume that the structure accounts for half of the home’s market value. The demolition 
therefore removes $83,720 of market value from the tax roles. The effective property tax 
rate is 1.029 percent, so the loss of this market value directly reduces annual tax 
collections by $861 dollars. We conservatively assume that the lot will remain empty for 
five years, for a total loss of $4,307. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Median Home Price in Auburn/Gresham Neighborhood of Chicago 167,440$        
Improvement (Structure) Share of House Value 0.5 83,720$          
Effective Tax Rate 0.01029
Annual Loss 861$               
Five Year Loss 5 4,307$            
Expenditure per event 4,307$        
 
 
Cost 20: Preparing and Trying Case in Demolition Court 
As noted earlier, we use the same hourly legal cost rate of $168 in all three court 
venues (explained in Cost 10 above). According to our respondent at DOL, demolition 
cases, require preparation of roughly 10 hours and an additional 25 hours to for the 
court process. The total expenditure on such case therefore approaches $6,000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Hourly rate for legal team 168$              
Hours of effort needed 35
Total cost per case 5,884$           
Expenditure per event 5,884$       
 
Cost 21: Administering Demolition Court 
As noted in the description of the cost of administering Housing Court, the costs of 
administering the civil courts discussed here are similar. We therefore use the same 
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numbers for operating expenses across the three cost figures (Costs 2, 13, and 20). 
The latter two are higher, however, because there is no court offset, as explained in the 
Cost 13 description. 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Chancery Court per event cost 228$              
Expenditure per event 228$           
 
Cost 22: Unpaid Property Taxes Foregone 
Calculating the value of revenue lost on unpaid taxes is virtually impossible due the 
complexity of the tax sale process, which involves multiple sale types and recovery 
routes, as well as a way for the County to actually collect nothing in some cases even in 
which it does ‘sell’ the lien (this occurs through the ‘sale in error’ loophole). Our method 
makes several assumptions about the compensating effects of various over and 
underestimates. 
 
On average, during the years for which we have data (1999-2002), 43.9 percent of tax 
claims were sold at the annual sale (the sale in which the City typically collects the full 
amount owed). The average tax bill due on properties unsold at the annual sale was 
slightly more than $1,012. We assume that a higher share of properties are sold but do 
not account for the losses associated with opportunity cost of funds tied up in the tax 
process or the fact that many parcels are taken over by the City, only a fraction of which 
are rapidly returned to the tax roles or generate compensation for the County. Using this 
method halves the estimate to $506 in losses per event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Amount due over four year period in Chicago 54,060,019$       
Number of properties 53,402
Amoutn due per property 1,012$           
Likelihood of recovery 0.5
Expenditure per event 506$          
 
 
Cost 23: Utility Taxes Foregone 
 
 
   
                   - 51 - 
Utilities losses accrue because services are typically not shut off by providers at the first 
missed payment. Rather, shutoffs are triggered by non-payment thresholds. Further, in 
the case of gas for heating, providers are barred from shutting off anyone’s supply 
during the winter months by a City ordinance. Because usage, and hence bills, are 
highest in winter, large bills often accrue before gas can be legally cut. Our interviewee 
at People’s Gas provided an estimate of $1,000 as the typical unpaid bill on a vacant 
property and an average monthly bill of $112. The typical delinquency period is 
therefore nine months, during which time the City loses tax revenue at a rate of 1.8 
percent (the municipal gas tax rate) of the unpaid balance, or roughly $2 per month. For 
electricity, the tax rate is $0.0061 per kilowatt hour. Applying this to monthly usage of 
600 kilowatt hours for a typical home yields monthly taxes of roughly $4. Over nine 
months, the combined losses on taxes and electric are $51. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Tax rate on electricity (per kilowatt hour) 0.0061
Kilowatt hours used in typical single family home (month) 600
Average monthly tax paid for single family detached home 4$                   
Tax rate on gas 0.018
Average monthly bill for single family detached home 112.00$              2$                   
Monthly tax gas amount
Average unpaid period 9
Total foregone tax revenues during unpaid period 51$                 
Expenditure per event 51$             
 
Cost 24: Unpaid Water/Sewer Bill 
As noted in the text of the report, the City is actually the water provider in Chicago. The 
obvious cost consequence of this in a delinquency situation is that the City sustains 
losses more rapidly and directly on water than on other utilities. We were not able to get 
an average shutoff period from the Department of Water and so use the nine month 
figure from the other utility calculations in the preceding expense. In cases where 
homes are un-metered, bulk rates are used to compute water charges. We use the rate 
for a typical single family home of around $30/month (specific rates vary based on 
things such as the type of fixtures inside the unit). Multiplying this by nine months yields 
$270. As with demolition and boarding, however, the City can issue liens to recoup 
some of its losses. We assume that the recovery rate on these liens is the same as for 
demolition liens (40 percent), reducing the loss on the average unpaid bill to $162. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Monthly bill for typical home 30$                 
Length of unpaid period 9
Total losses over nonpaying period 270$               
Share of water liens recovered 0.4
Redution in net loss due to lien recoveries 108$               
Net Expenditure per event 162$           
 
Cost 25: Removing Trash from Vacant Units or Lot and Mowing the Lawn 
Because vacant homes and lots attract trash, in some cases through illegal dumping, 
and City ordinances mandate that properties are kept from becoming eyesores, debris 
must be removed from vacant homes and lots, and lawns must be mowed periodically. 
These tasks fall to the Department of Streets and Sanitation. We were unable to obtain 
a cost estimate from Chicago for these activities so we instead use the figure of $5,000 
for the same tasks in Buffalo noted in a recent article on abandoned properties in 
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Affordable Housing Finance.28 Due to the higher price level in Chicago relative to 
Buffalo this figure likely underestimates this cost element. The $5,000 figure agrees in 
principle with HUD’s reimbursement rate of $35 per cubic yard for trash removal from its 
properties. 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Buffalo estimate 5,000$           
Expenditure per event 5,000$        
 
Cost 26: Fire Suppression 
The cost of fire suppression obviously varies with the severity of the fire. Relative to 
other residential fires those stemming from the foreclosure and vacancy processes are 
problematic because they are typically unreported until they are burning intensely and, 
in some cases, until they have become a threat to neighboring properties. (In contrast, 
fires in occupied units are often reported earlier by their legal occupants.) In the 
interests of being conservative, we treat all fires equally, dividing the budget of the 
Operations Division of the Fire Department by the number of fires (for the year 2000) to 
get a per fire cost of $14,020. 
 
 
 
 
 
expense cost/amount multiplier total
Budget of Fire departmetn Operations Division 311,418,526$ 
Number of Fire Responses 22,213
Expenditure per event 14,020$     
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28 Anderson, B. 2004. New Jersey Fights Blight. Affordable Housing Finance. June. pp. 78-79. 
APPENDIX B: INDIRECT COST EFFECTS 
 
In addition to direct impacts on municipal expenditures and tax receipts, there are 
numerous indirect ways that foreclosure imposes costs on municipalities, as well as 
other homeowners, property owners and individuals with a financial stake in the area 
where the foreclosure occurs. Unlike direct costs, these indirect costs are especially 
difficult to measure. Even so, it is important not to lose sight of them because these 
indirect effects may significantly add to the overall social costs of foreclosure, especially 
in situations of concentrated foreclosures.  
 
Indirect Impact on Area Property Values and Municipal Tax Receipts 
Because homes tend to deteriorate and/or are left vacant during the foreclosure process, 
foreclosed homes tend to become associated with crime and general unsightliness, and 
act as a deterrent for prospective borrowers. The result is that prospective homebuyers 
consider the area desirable and will pay less for properties located near to vacant or 
otherwise unattractive foreclosed properties. Reduced desirability will eventually 
decrease (or reduce the rate of increase of) area home values. This same phenomenon 
may also adversely impact business location decisions as well as reducing the 
profitability of existing business in the city. This in turn can impact (where applicable) 
sales and income tax receipts.  
 
Unless carefully monitored, the sale of foreclosed properties (REO sales) can also 
depress property price appreciation. Homes sold at foreclosure sales have typically 
deteriorated and require substantially more work than ‘normal’ properties. Selling prices 
therefore reflects the new owner’s anticipated expenses for deferred maintenance and 
repairs and are proportionately lower. These lower prices are then part of the set of 
‘comps’ used by real estate agents. Therefore, if properties sold at a ‘foreclosure 
discount’ are used in valuing others in the area, this will tend to reduce the price 
appreciation on other homes in neighborhoods where foreclosures and vacant buildings 
are common. Both the direct value reductions and reduced house price appreciation 
translate into lower assessed values and thereby reduced municipal tax revenues. 
 
Though in theory, these indirect impacts are most plausible, in the only published effort 
to measure the magnitude of these effects, a study by Temple University, found that in 
Philadelphia properties within 150 feet of an abandoned unit sold for $7,627 less than 
those not located near abandoned units, with the effect tapering off to $3,543 at 
distances of 300-450 feet, and the impact being negligible beyond 450 feet (the length 
of a typical block). Further, having two abandoned properties on the same block was 
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shown to lower sales prices for homes on the block by more than $10,000.29 These 
findings are consistent with a broader literature on the impact of so-called negative 
externalities on house price appreciation. Though these studies also face significant 
empirical challenges, they nevertheless indicate that the presence of a deteriorated 
property (or the removal of a similar blighting influence) can reduce (or increase in the 
case of blight removal) area property values by as much as 10 percent – with the 
largest impacts being recorded on properties located closest to the blighted property.30  
 
Although no study on this issue has been conducted in Chicago, the adverse impact of 
blighting influences such as foreclosure related vacancies is likely to be strong enough 
to reduce block and sub-block level home prices (or lower the rate price appreciation). 
Steady upward movement of prices in all neighborhoods in the City and active 
speculation and flipping by professional investors that ‘paint and patch’ in order to turn a 
quick profit may temporarily obscure this effect, but over time the fact that, all else equal, 
potential buyers do not want to invest their life savings in a home next to or near an 
eyesore serving as a potential site for crime, fires, and other problems will work to keep 
prices down in the immediate vicinity of vacant units. 
 
The extent to which serious delinquency and foreclosure generate these indirect costs 
will depend of course on the degree to which foreclosures concentrate. A single 
foreclosure in an otherwise economically healthy neighborhood is certainly a negative 
factor, but as the number of foreclosures in a single area mount, the negative 
consequences are likely to increase disproportionately. Consider the situation facing the 
8300 Block of South Morgan Street in the Auburn/Gresham neighborhood depicted 
earlier in Figure B. Of the 37 properties on the block, over the period 1993 to 2002, one 
was demolished, 4 had multiple foreclosures, 2 more were identified by neighborhood 
groups as problem buildings, and a final 2 experienced less problematic types of 
foreclosure. In such a case, the impact of serious delinquency, foreclosure, and related 
vacancy on property values and property tax collections is surely substantial. Given that 
the effective tax rate in the city is 1.029 percent per $1,000 of value,31 even the loss of 
one modest home valued at $100,000 costs the city $1,209 each year.  
 
Indirect Costs for Other Parties 
While this paper focuses on municipal costs, it is important to recognize that other 
individuals and firms suffer losses as a result of serious delinquencies and foreclosures. 
                                                 
29 Anne B. Shlay and Gordon Whitman. 2004. Research for Democracy: Linking Community Organizing and Research to 
Leverage Blight Policy. University of Toledo COMM-ORG working paper. http://comm-
org.utoledo.edu/papers2004/shlay/shlay.htm.  
30 For a summary of the literature on the housing spillover effects see Amy Ellen Schwartz, Ingrid Gould Ellen, Ioan Voicu, and 
Michael H. Schill, (2003). Estimating the External of Subsidized Housing Investments on Property Values. A paper prepared 
for the Federal Reserve System Conference on Sustainable Community Development.  
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31 The property tax rate is 6.433 percent while assessments are 16 percent of market value.  
For example, in addition to expenses incurred by the city, residents of the 3800 Block of 
South Morgan Street in Auburn/Gresham also suffer losses as a result of the failure of 
their neighbors’ mortgages. Looking only at the one unit actually demolished on the 
block, if the spillover affects just the three homes on either side (total of six) and the 
same set across the street (seven more), thirteen homeowners (those within 150 feet of 
the vacant unit) lost a collective $219,893 as a result of that one severely failed loan.32 
For the units determined to be ‘problem buildings’ the same price attenuating 
mechanism surely operates as well, though perhaps not to the same magnitude. 
 
Nor are property owners the only losers. The blight associated with a neighborhood 
littered with vacant and boarded homes will limit the willingness of customers to shop at 
nearby stores, and make it more difficult for local area employers to attract workers. 
Moreover, the negative impact also extends to other entities with a financial interest in 
loans on other properties on this block. To the extent that serious delinquency, 
foreclosure and resulting vacancy is concentrated in specific areas, the resulting 
downward pressure on home prices also reduces the value of the collateral that secures 
other loans in the area, just as it reduces the incentive for other mortgage borrowers to 
meet their mortgage payment obligations. As a result, foreclosures can help stimulate 
more foreclosures, and the circle of individuals suffering costs becomes quite wide 
indeed. 
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32 The $219,893 figure is calculated by adjusting the Philadelphia figure for reductions within 150 feet of the vacant unit by the 
ratio of City of Chicago to City of Philadelphia median house prices. As of the 2000 Census, Chicago’s median of $132,400 
was 2.21 times higher than Philadelphia’s $59,700. Multiplying the Philadelphia figure of $7,627 by 2.22 yields $16,915, which, 
multiplied by 13 yields $219,893.  
